Women’s Political Empowerment in Statebuilding and Peacebuilding:
A Baseline Study

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Women’s political empowerment at all levels is critical to minimizing the gender differences in health, education, economic opportunity, legal recourse, and many other aspects of all societies, but particularly those affected by conflict and fragility. Women’s participation in postconflict societies is critical to the advancement of the society as a whole. Women often participated in peace movements during conflict, yet their contributions to these processes, particularly at the local level, have rarely been acknowledged. While recognizing that women have also fought and supported conflict, they have the potential in many contexts to be an important force in preventing conflict from reoccurring or expanding. Women have dealt with the consequences of war at the most basic level: in sustaining their communities and households during times of conflict and in its aftermath. Yet rarely have they been fully incorporated into the most basic decisions affecting their lives and communities either as decision makers or as a group whose unequal access to resources and power need to be addressed. The particular needs of women based on ethnicity, race, caste, class, age, and other differences have been even more infrequent.

The various power inequalities, including gendered inequalities, embedded in postconflict and statebuilding initiatives are rarely acknowledged or addressed. Moreover, security is generally not seen in gendered terms, as a social phenomenon that creates a gendered order, defining what men and women can and can’t do and structuring relations of power between them. The consequences of these imbalances have profound consequences for the overall success of statebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. Without the full participation of women and without equal access to resources, opportunities, and power, these processes cannot fully succeed. Thus it is critical to understand the nature of the problem of women’s political empowerment in these fragile contexts, what forces are bringing about positive change, and what strategies they are employing. This report is an attempt to address some of these issues based on what is known in the literature.

Factors Influencing Political Empowerment of Women in Statebuilding and Peacebuilding

There are two key structural factors that have influenced changes for women in post-conflict countries. First, since the end of the Cold War there has been a global decline in the incidence and intensity of conflict. Conflict disrupted gender relations, especially at the local level and gave rise to peace and/or women’s movements that pushed for greater gender equality. Secondly, changing international norms regarding women’s rights have influenced donor, diplomatic, United Nations, and international nongovernmental organizations to expand women’s rights and representation and reinforced women’s movements to press for those changes from below.

The literature shows that the main drivers of change have been women’s movements and donors. These actors have had an impact on secondary drivers of change, which in some cases (not uniformly) have included peacekeeping operations, political parties, women’s policy agencies, and executive influences.

Postconflict countries that emerged out of conflict after 2000 have tended to see the most changes in terms of legislative and constitutional reform as well as increases in female political representation when compared with non-postconflict countries in the same regions. Also countries that have been most donor dependent have tended to be most keen to comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and other such international treaties and resolutions. They have made important short and medium term gains.
It is apparent that in the short and medium term one sees increased numbers of women in parliament, in courts and in the executive. One even sees the adoption of many woman friendly policies. We do not have sufficient evidence at this time to conclude whether these developments have resulted in the strongest positive gender outcomes in the long term and in substantive changes in women’s lives.

Scholarship on gender as it relates to peacebuilding and statebuilding is fairly new and undeveloped. The main topics that have attracted interest in both the academic and policy literature have to do with 1) women’s involvement in a variety of activities related to peacemaking, 2) violence against women, particularly sexual violence, and 3) transitional justice. Within the scholarship on conflict resolution, there has been a heavy focus on UNSCR 1325 and other treaties. Also analysis of peacekeeping operations from a gender perspective has been of great interest. Short and medium term outcomes are apparent in attitudinal changes and in increases in female political representation, and in legislative and constitutional reforms incorporating women’s rights. However, the gaps are particularly glaring when it comes to statebuilding in postconflict and fragile state settings more generally.

The study recommends greater attention to women’s political empowerment and its impacts on long-term gender outcomes with respect to 1) social services, 2) economic participation; 3) property and land rights; 4) the rule of law; 5) constitutional reforms; 6) legislative reforms; 7) electoral processes, 8) political representation and 9) decentralization and local government. There are a handful of articles on service provision, workforce participation, and constitutional and legislative reform in select postconflict countries. The literature on statebuilding is weaker than the peacebuilding literature.

Although there are many large gaps in the literature, the biggest problem is the quality of research. There is very little basic research in this area, either qualitative or quantitative. The work is very descriptive and much of it draws simply on secondary sources. Very little scholarship is motivated by puzzles, hypotheses, or theoretically driven questions. There are numerous unsubstantiated claims that are repeated in the literature, which may or may not be true, but would require empirical investigation. Unsubstantiated claims and exaggerations are dangerous because they undermine the credibility of all scholarship in this area and they impair the development of good policy and advocacy strategies.

The research is carried out primarily by scholars from the global north, who often don’t have the requisite background knowledge of the country they are studying nor the necessary language skills. The study recommends more attention be paid to supporting sustained research in the postconflict countries themselves, while at the same time ensuring that those who carry out the research have the requisite methodological skills.

The study asks some difficult questions about what it means to adopt a focus on statebuilding, particularly in countries where the state is predatory and the main source of human rights abuses. When donors focus on statebuilding, it often comes at the expense of civil society and women’s organizations. Yet these actors are critical in shaping statebuilding in ways that make the state more responsive to citizens and specifically women’s rights.

Another challenge relates to how a research agenda in this area will respond to the declining levels of conflict globally and changes in the nature of conflict. The gender impacts of these changes are only beginning to be explored.
Recommendations

In a nutshell then, this paper calls for more attention to:

1. Long-term impacts and outcomes of interventions aimed at advancing gender equality;
2. Gendered contributions to and impacts on statebuilding;
3. Structural factors in postconflict and fragile contexts, particularly economic factors;
4. Processes of gender policy change, particularly the role of 1) changing international and domestic norms regarding women’s rights, 2) donor resources, 3) international pressures on domestic governments and rebels in negotiating peace agreements with woman friendly language; 4) media initiatives; 5) networking between regional women’s organizations and NGOs; 6) changing institutional arrangements and 7) the role of executive and 8) the removal of warlords and militias as viable actors on the political scene.
5. What makes regimes open to gender policy change, particularly how they respond to 1) pressure from the women’s movements, state femocrats, and interest groups to demand changes in women’s rights; 2) donor pressures to adopt women’s rights reforms; 3) legislative capacity and independence from the executive; 4) the ways in which the interest groups or policy coalitions engage the executive and legislature through political settlements; 5) the capacity of legislatures to develop and control politics independently of the executive; 6) mechanisms to come to a consensus; and 5) judicial independence.
6. Frames that are most useful in shaping gender policy interventions;
7. Women’s formal and informal engagement with peace processes; histories of movements and initiatives;
8. Planning, design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs and security sector reforms;
9. The meaning of transitional justice in postwar contexts where resources, enforcement and political commitment are weak;
10. To what extent donor resources set the gender agenda, interfere with it or compliment women’s movement activities and goals?

I. INTRODUCTION

This report is an assessment of the state of the literature on gender and peacebuilding and statebuilding, which are fairly new areas of research, particularly the latter. This assessment first discusses key concepts and the methodology employed in the study. It draws on this literature and other data to describe a model that helps explain what factors influence how postconflict countries coming out of conflict in the 1990s, but especially after 2000, have adopted policies supporting gender equality, including constitutional reforms, legislative changes and increases in female political representation. In fact, women have almost double the rates of legislative representation compared with countries in the same region that have not gone through conflict, largely due to the introduction of quota policies and legislation. This has happened primarily in countries that have had long conflicts of high intensity (high rate of death). The study discusses structural factors that have influenced these outcomes (particularly the decline of conflict globally and changing international norms regarding gender equality). The study points to key drivers of this change (women’s movements and donors) and the strategies they have employed. It describes their activities and describes what we know from the literature, particularly in terms of short and medium term outcomes.
The study evaluates the strength and production of the knowledge base; identifies evidence gaps and strengths; the key challenges involved in this research; and key considerations for donors funding research in this area. It concludes with recommendations for donors.

III. KEY CONCEPTS

**Peacebuilding:** Following the UN’s usage, peacebuilding is seen a continuum of measures aimed at reducing the risk of return to conflict by strengthening national capacity for conflict management and laying the foundations for durable peace and development. It includes support for the following types of activities:

a. Conflict prevention: Basic safety and security and protection of civilians
b. Peacemaking: Diplomacy, negotiations, informal and community strategies
c. Peacekeeping: Presence of peacekeeping forces; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform

2. Statebuilding

Following the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition, state building is seen as “purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups” (OECD-DAC 2008, 14). This definition departs from more conventional definitions that focus primarily on the effectiveness of state institutions and state action. The OECD definition adopts a broader understanding that incorporates the notion of legitimacy and resilience.

State building requires the rebuilding of a social contract between state and society based on societal expectations of a legitimate state; state capacity to provide services, including security; state capacity to tax its citizens to provide these services; and the existence of an elite to ensure that state resources are used to meet social expectations through institutionalized political processes that create and maintain such synergies. Legitimacy shapes expectations and facilitates political process. Legitimacy is shaped by the political legacy of the state, performance in service delivery, the processes of governance, and international recognition.

Statebuilding includes various forms of recovery and development:

a. Provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education;
b. Restoring core government functions, particularly basic public administration and public finance;
c. Safe return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people;
d. Economic revitalization, including creating jobs, particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants;
e. Strengthening the rule of law;
f. Constitutional reform;
g. Legislative reform;
h. Electoral processes.
The relationship between peacebuilding and statebuilding is not a linear one. These are interrelated processes. Statebuilding may lead to peace when it seeks inclusivity and legitimacy by seeking to respond to societal demands for public goods and services. However, statebuilding may also result in a strengthened state that may not be inclusive or democratic and may result in continued or renewed conflict. It may result in a weakened civil society, which is necessary to play a watchdog role and build synergies with societal actors. Peace agreements may result in strengthening repressive elements by placing them into leadership. They can elevate certain leaders who use the state to enrich themselves, thereby perpetuating conflict and division. Similarly, peacebuilding initiatives that do not address state capacity can in the long run undermine those very same efforts at peacemaking for the aforementioned reasons (Menocal 2009). Thus, these two processes need to be seen as mutually reinforcing in ways that enhance legitimacy and state-society synergies.

**Fragile states:** The concept of fragility is often considered somewhat vague since it can encompass a wide variety of states. It is the opposite of resilience, which, drawing on the OECD framework, derives from a reconciliation of citizen-state expectations. Fragility results from a breakdown in the political processes that manage the state-society contract. Fragile states are particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks as well as conflict. In this paper, fragility is seen as a situation where the state lacks the political will or capacity to meet basic state functions of providing security and services, encouraging development and protecting the rights of its citizens. It is unable to meet citizen expectations in all these areas or manage citizenship expectations through the political process. Fragility is produced by a disruption in state-society relations and it results in weak states, internal conflict, state collapse, post-war states and semi-authoritarian states (Call and Wyeth 2008).

**Women’s empowerment:** Empowerment is one of the more slippery concepts in development, meaning different things to different people (Batliwala 1994). Liberal or modernization understandings of empowerment see women’s empowerment in instrumental terms, as a means to development, eradicating poverty, lowering fertility rates, building peace, or environmental sustainability. It is premised on the need for individual growth and personal autonomy. Women’s needs, interests and perspectives fall out of these approaches; the approaches are generally apolitical, and the power dimensions of gender inequalities are not fully appreciated. These approaches characterize much of donor discourse on gender to this day, even among donors that purport to adopt a more agency orientation to women’s rights (Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead 2008).

One such approach, the human development or capability approach, advanced by Amartya Sen (1992) and Martha Nussbaum (2000), incorporate the idea that people need to be ensured basic capabilities in order to live a full life. Nussbaum includes in this list life itself; health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; living with other species; play; and control over one’s environment. In other words, people need to live in conditions under which they can fully express themselves and develop. For Naila Kabeer (1999), these abilities include resources, agency (or capacity of define and pursue strategic choices); and achievements or outcomes of exercising capacity.

But all of these capability approaches beg the question: what kind of political, economic and social environment would create the kinds of conditions needed to best advance these
capabilities? What political strategies would create these capabilities, and how are these strategies to be implemented? What is the role of agency and collective action? How can capability capture the various inequalities women face in terms of class, race, ethnicity, caste, and other such identities, not to mention global inequalities?

Zambian feminist activist Sarah Longwe developed a Women’s Empowerment Framework that was an explicitly political model that was widely adopted in many in African development initiatives. She saw empowerment as a process that started from meeting women’s basic welfare needs (income, nutrition, health) to greater access to resources such as land, agricultural inputs, credit, information, etc.; individual awareness of structural forces that disadvantage and discriminate against women; mobilization; and finally women’s entry into decision-making, legislative, state and other institutions. The approach links women’s inequality to structural oppression, but it does not explain how or why one might move from one level to the next.

Efforts have been made by Latin American and South Asian feminists as well to address the seeming depoliticization of empowerment as a political concept. Thus, drawing on Batliwala (1993), Sardenberg (2000) and Romano (2002) as well as the earlier work of the DAWN feminists (Sen and Grown 1987), one might think of empowerment first and foremost as a relational concept that involves changes in social relationships which often take place through conflict, contention or struggle. It may begin with the individual as a change of consciousness, but eventually it leads to collective agency. It is a process that tackles all structures of power and as such it can be very messy, not something that can be necessarily resolved easily through a donor project, for example, or an educational program. To be sure, the development of human capabilities are necessary, but ultimately insufficient. There must be an end result of real change in the environment, in institutions, and in the conditions that people find themselves in. Empowerment should also change the way that power is conceived away from zero sum notions of “power over” to mutual empowerment. I would add to Batliwala’s original conception the idea that it needs to address problems of intersectionality, as one cannot assume all women are the same. Moreover, there are power differences between them as well. They have different identities that intersect and assume different importance depending on the context. These differences are often premised on inequalities within societies but also globally between societies. Thus empowerment is in essence a political process.

Political empowerment of women relates to women’s capacity to assume leadership roles within government, legislatures, local government, parties, and other decision-making and policy making arenas. It involves not only participation in elections and other institutions, but also playing a watchdog role and advocating for changes in a social movement context, from communities to the national level.

Security: In order to evaluate postconflict gender strategies, it is important to consider how problems of security are framed and whose security is at stake. The literature on peacebuilding grows out of earlier work by feminist scholars in international relations, who questioned conventional realist understandings of conflict and the frames which defined the study of war and militarism (e.g., Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, Peterson, V. Spike, Anne Sisson Runyan, Christine Sylvester, Marysia Zalewski). The critique was deepened with a new generation of IR feminist scholars (e.g., Laura Sjoberg, Laura Shepherd, Sandra Via, Elisabeth Prügl, Charli Carpenter, Helen Kinsella). A major preoccupation of feminist international relations theory has been the gendered nature of conflict (e.g., Cynthia Cockburn, Cynthia Enloe, Joshua Goldstein).
Feminist security studies — which range in perspective from critical feminism, to feminist constructivism, liberal feminism, post-structuralism, and postcolonial feminism — have problematized the notion of security for over two decades (Sjoberg 2010, 4). They ask whose security policymakers are seeking: that of the state or of people, and of women in particular. Feminist scholars have challenged the lack of women in international security policymaking, documenting the masculine nature of the state and security agencies nationally and globally. They have broadened our understanding of security to include not just war, but also interpersonal violence, rape, poverty, and environmental destruction. They have questioned how safe women are as a result of state protection.

Feminist security scholars have also critiqued the gendered nature of concepts of state violence, war, peace, peacekeeping, militarization, and soldiering. They have interrogated the essentialist link that is so often drawn between women and peace, without fully appreciating women’s roles in promoting and participating in war (Blanchard 2003). They have examined the relationship between masculinity and war, not just assumptions about men as fighters, but also men as civilians who are targeted because of gender stereotypes. These scholars have critiqued the way “gender” and “women” are used interchangeably in international security discourse, e.g., within UN documents. They have described the state as patriarchal and have debated whether the increase of women into military institutions changes the patriarchal nature of the institutions and the extension of militarism into civilian life (Enloe 2000). The scholars have examined the ways in which gender defines and is defined by international actors, e.g., the military often relies on the unpaid labor of women to care for wounded soldiers. They have challenged the instrumental use of women as a rationale to go to war. State foreign policies are seen as gendered and are influenced by masculinity, heterosexism and the gendered nature of militarism (Peterson and Runyan 1999).

Studies of peacebuilding and gender have built on work in feminist IR that asks whose security counts: state security, human security or both? Discussions of human security have taken up this debate, which has somewhat paradoxically been largely ignored by IR feminists, with a few exceptions (e.g., Annick Wibben, Heidi Hudson). Human security emphasizes non-state actors, and the agency of multiple actors. Rather than focusing on strategic national interests it looks at collective needs of people. Some scholars have sought to improve the idea from a feminist perspective (Charlotte Bunch, Anuradha M. Chenoy, Saskia Wieringa, and Amrita Chhachhi, G. Hoogensen, Natalie Hudson), while others found the concept lacking. Many feminist security scholars have critiqued the concept of human security and its applications for adopting too much of a traditional focus on state security and using the same logic of national security as more conventional notions of security have employed (Berman 2007). Some feminists have dismissed the concept outright because they fear that its applications, particularly the Responsibility to Protect norm, differ little from traditional state-based strategies.

Finally, there is a fairly extensive international relations/comparative politics literature examines the positive relationship between gender equality and conflict (e.g., Mary Caprioli, Mark Boyer, Erik Melander, Valerie Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, Chad Emmett) as well as attitudes toward equality and conflict (e.g., Mark Tessler, Ina Warriner, Elizabeth Cook, Clyde Wilcox; Pamela Conover, Virginia Sapiro). This literature is important in that it shows the importance of gender equality to preventing conflict: societies that are more equal tend to be less conflict prone.
This report adopts a feminist and human security approach to security. It draws on feminist perspectives to security that have challenged the focus on military and exclusively statist solutions to problems. Its focus is on addressing structural problems before they become violent crises. The emphasis is on prevention rather than intervention, and on civil solutions rather than military ones. Women need to be integrated into all peacemaking efforts at all levels and at all points in time to ensure the success of peacebuilding initiatives. They need to be part of efforts to address long term structural inequalities, early warning initiatives, conflict management and conflict resolution strategies, peacekeeping, and post-conflict disarmament initiatives. Their involvement is critical to pursuing a broad range of peacemaking and statebuilding strategies that go beyond narrow military responses.

III. METHODOLOGY

An initial database was created from keyword searches on title and abstract of articles, books, and online reports. The bibliography includes sources that were consulted in developing the initial database. Existing bibliographies were also consulted for further references.

A. Defining Relevant Studies: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

A database was created along the following parameters:

a) The database is divided into the following categories:
   • Journal articles (120).
   • Reports or grey literature, including Impact evaluations, expert consultation, synthesis studies (118)
   • Books (edited and monographs) (46)
   • Book chapters (104)

b) Studies that have appeared since 2005 in order to delimit the study in a doable yet meaningful way. At times the report draws on an older pre-2005 literature in order to reflect on some of the longitudinal changes in our knowledge base.

c) General debates on peacebuilding and statebuilding are included along with everything that came up in general searches. The report focuses primarily on countries that have come out of major conflict since 2000. Specific country searches were carried out only on the following countries that fall into this category: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Nepal, Timor-Leste (ended in 1999), Indonesia (Aceh), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Southern Sudan. Rwanda is also included.

d) The focus is primarily on post conflict issues, however, it includes peace negotiations and informal and community actions taken at the time of transition/negotiations. These activities frame much of what transpires in the period after conflict is significantly reduced.

e) Publications are only in English given the limited time frame of this study.

f) Only developing countries are analyzed, given that most conflicts have taken place in countries that had pre-existing weak states. This allows for greater comparability.

The report does not include monitoring and evaluation reports since they were written for a different purpose than research, making comparability difficult. They also are not generally considered evidence-based studies in the same way as conventional research.
B. Case Selection

The countries selected for analysis in this study (see Table 1) came out of conflict after 2000, with the exception of Timor Leste, where the conflict ended in 1999. The cases include a diverse set of conflicts. They include a proxy war that started during the Cold War conflict (Angola 1975-2002) and another proxy war between Uganda and Sudan in northern Uganda (1987-2006) that had its origins in an uprising of the Holy Spirit Movement led by a spirit medium Alice Lakwena. The northern Ugandan conflict was a continuation of a war that had started as ethnic competition for control of the state and ended in Yoweri Museveni’s takeover of the country (Uganda 1980-1986). The cases also include ethnic conflict (Burundi 1994-2000; First Liberian Civil War 1989-1996, Second Liberian Civil War 1999-2003; Angola 1975-2002); separatist movements (Sri Lanka 1983-2009; Aceh in Indonesia 1976-2005); mutiny (First Ivorian War 2002); elite takeover and forcible ouster of president (Second Ivorian War 2010-2011); regional conflict (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea); a Maoist insurgency (Nepal 1996-2006); internal resource-based conflicts (First Liberian Civil War 1989-1996, Second Liberian Civil War 1999-2003; Angola 1975-2002; Sierra Leone 1991-2000); and external intervention (First Congo War 1996-97; Second Congo War 1998-2003). The Sudanese conflict involved guerilla war for regional autonomy (First Sudanese Civil War or Anyanya rebellion 1955-1972) and a fight for united secular state and for autonomy in the south (Second Sudanese Civil War 1983-2005). A referendum was held in 2005, leading to full independence for South Sudan. These conflicts also include a guerilla campaign in Timor Leste against Indonesian occupation (1975-1999), ending in a major battle in 1999. The Chadian wars were characterized by competition between regions in the country and by external Libyan involvement (1969-79, 1979-1982, 1998-2002, 2005-2010).

These conflicts came to an end in a variety different ways: in Angola through the death of opposition leader, Jonas Savimbi; in Uganda through exit of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army to neighboring countries; through a negotiated settlement in the case of the DR Congo and Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, South Sudan, and the end of monarchy in Nepal. The conflicts described also are located in countries with a variety of colonial pasts. They include former

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh (Indonesia)</td>
<td>1976-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1994-2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>First Ivorian War 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Ivorian War 2010-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>First Congo War 1996-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Congo War 1998-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>First Liberian Civil War 1989-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Liberian Civil War 1999-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1996-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1983-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan (Sudan)</td>
<td>First Sudanese Civil War 1955-1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Sudanese Civil War 1983-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colonies (Uganda, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone), a former Dutch colony (Indonesia); a former Portuguese colony (Angola, East Timor), former Belgian colonies (DR Congo, Burundi), a German colony (Burundi); and former French colonies (Chad and Cote d'Ivoire).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Assessment: Coding and Description

A database was created of information on each article, book, book chapter and report and included the following categories for analysis: type of research (basic research, policy paper, etc.); journal or publisher of study; geographic parameters; year published, key words, abstract, frame adopted by author (human security, human development, human rights, gender mainstreaming, feminist international relations, etc.); methodology employed (survey, content analysis, meta analysis, crossnational statistical analysis, in-depth interviews, focus groups, participant observation, Rapid Rural Assessment, etc.); Citation count in Google Scholar (which allowed for uniform comparisons across literature types, both academic and non-academic).

Each publication was evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=high, 2 = medium, 3= low) based on appropriateness of design; generalizability; empirical contribution, quality of data; theoretical contribution; significance of contribution; strength of research design (are methods appropriate to answering questions asked) and overall evaluation. Comments on key weaknesses and strengths of the pieces were noted where salient.

D. Limitations of Study

Cutting off the study at 2005 and not looking at the earlier literature eliminates some important literature that precedes these dates, particularly the Latin American and Caribbean cases, although they were incorporated in places. However, the dynamics in these earlier cases, while important from a longitudinal comparative perspective, do not fit the patterns seen in conflicts ending after 2000 because of the influences of changing global gender norms are much more apparent in later years. Not including literature in languages other than English eliminates, by definition, key findings from particular countries and biases the study toward the English speaking ones. Important insights from non-developing countries and smaller conflicts within countries also limited the study although some were in fact incorporated when they were parts of comparative studies.

V. FACTORS INFLUENCING POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN IN STATEBUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING

A. Structural Factors

There are two key structural factors that have influenced changes for women in post-conflict countries. First, since the end of the Cold War there has been a global decline in the incidence and intensity of conflict, which disrupted gender relations, especially at the local level and gave rise to peace and/or women’s movements that pushed for greater gender equality. Secondly, changing international norms regarding women's rights have influenced donor, diplomatic, United Nations,
and international nongovernmental organizations to expand women’s rights and representation and reinforced women’s movements to press for those changes from below. Those countries that have been most donor dependent have tended to be most keen to comply with CEDAW, UNSCR 1325, and other such international treaties and resolutions affecting women’s rights outcomes.

Other factors such as regime type, state capacity and economic well being have shaped the extent to which societies have been able to move from positive short term and medium term outcomes for women, to producing longer term outcomes (see Figure 3).

1. Decline of Conflict Globally

The first factor that has shaped advancements in women’s rights was the increase in the resolution of conflicts due to the end of Cold War; increased importance of international and regional peacekeeping and peace negotiations globally; and the increase in influence of peace movements and women’s movements. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a global decline in the incidence and intensity of conflict (Human Security Report Project 2006: Goldstein 2011). There has been both a decline in the number of conflicts starting and resuming as well as an increase in the number of conflicts ending, which is evident from data derived from several databases, including Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data (see Figures 1, 2 and Table 2).

The term “decline in conflict” in this report describes situations where there have been significant declines in the numbers of deaths related to conflict and where there has been a decline in hostilities. This characterization of a decline in conflict does not imply that violence
Table 2. Number and Incidence of Major Armed Conflict by Region

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Source: The Uppsala Conflict Data Project, SIPRI 2001 (Table 1A.2, p. 64), 2010 (Table 2A.2, p. 61)

Figure 1. Number and Incidence of Major Armed Conflict by Region


Figure 2. Number and Incidence of Major Armed Conflict

Source: The Uppsala Conflict Data Project
has ended, nor does it imply as Page Fortna (2004) claims, that peace is “the absence of war.” Numerous forms of violence continue in postconflict contexts, particularly for women. Recent research suggests that the death rate for women is higher than for men after the conflict is over (Ormhaug, Meier, Hernes 2009).

The decline in conflict, which is a global phenomenon, is particularly salient in Africa, where it is tied to the improving political and economic climate in Africa over the past two decades. Since the 1990s, there has been a general shift toward political liberalization and democratization in Africa, with an increase in civilian-led regimes and a shift away from military regimes. Multipartyism has been introduced in virtually all African countries, along with the holding of contested elections. Almost all African countries have experienced greater freedom of expression and association and an increase in political and civil liberties, resulting mostly in the creation of hybrid regimes, which are neither fully democratic nor authoritarian. This has lessened the likelihood that opposition forces need to resort to violence to attain power since the ballot box offers some possibilities, even if they are limited.

There has also been the increased use of peacekeeping troops and peace diplomacy. Although the UN has generally taken the lead in peacekeeping operations, other actors have played supporting roles through diplomacy. These include regional peacekeeping organizations (Fortna 2004, Stedman et al. 2002), the World Bank, foreign donors, and other actors within international and domestic civil society. The expansion of conflict resolution initiatives was related to an increase in UN and regional peacemaking efforts, from preventative and behind-the-scenes diplomacy to negotiations, UN sanctions, peacekeeping interventions and disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation of soldiers. International awareness has heightened around issues relating to child soldiers, blood diamonds, small arms trade, and violence against civilians, resulting in heightened pressure to end conflicts (Human Security Report 2006, Collier et al. 2003). Of all the factors that have influenced these changes, the least studied has been the role of civil society and, in particular, peace and women’s movements as well as conflict resolution international and domestic NGOs, which played a number of different roles in helping end conflicts and prevent new ones from arising or reigniting.

Disruptions of Gender Roles and Relations

A few studies have focused on postconflict backlash against women (de Watteville 2002; Meintjes et al. 2002; Turshen 2002; Pankhurst 2003; Kelly 2000; Pankhurst and Pearce 1997). It appears, however, that the dominant trend in the aftermath of conflict has been the disruption of traditional gender roles and relations, creating incentives for women to demand greater rights and representation. This was especially evident in countries that have undergone major conflict, i.e., countries which had conflicts that were long in duration and intense in numbers killed. Thus, Tripp and Hughes (2010) found a strong correlation between women’s legislative representation and the length and intensity of conflict. This suggests that the higher the death rates and the longer the conflict, the more it disrupted the status quo when it came to gender roles and relations. They also argue that this explains why smaller rebellions and election related violence generally have not resulted in major changes in women’s legal status.

Prolonged conflict also disrupted gender roles, thrusting women into new activities in the absence of men. In many cases, they ran businesses and sought new sources of livelihood, supported the household, and played more active roles in communities. These transformations continued in the postconflict period. The disruptions of war dislodged traditional gender roles
and relations, opening up new possibilities for women, creating new visions of what was possible. It created incentives for women to demand greater political representation and more rights (Boyd 1989; Corrin 2002; Goetz 1995; Meintjes 2002; Pankhurst 2002; Sambanis 2002; Tripp 2000; Turshen 2001).

In Nepal, the absence of men during the civil war meant that women formed not only the bulk of the subsistence agricultural economy but they also began to step into public life in village councils. In parts of Nepal, women took on the male task of plowing the land during the conflict, and in its aftermath girls filled the schools at unprecedented rates (Gautam et al. 2001, Manchanda 2005). The same thing happened in Sri Lanka, where Tamil women were forced into the public arena and to pursue new technical, commercial and professional skills. Women engaged in lagoon fishing, food processing, and marketing in ways they had not before. They became entrepreneurs, owned many fishing boats, employed large numbers of men and managed marketing networks. They also challenged the seclusion of unmarried women and the treatment of widows as polluted. During the conflict many new women's groups emerged, along with ad hoc coalitions and broader civil society mobilization (Manchanda 2005).

In many cases in northern and northeastern Uganda, women become the key decision makers and breadwinners in the family (Binder et al. 2008). The Teso Women’s Peace Association, Kitgum Women’s Peace Initiative and Gulu District Women’s Development Committee played important roles in local dispute settlement and as peace activists: they provided services to victims of conflict, organized local peace groups and clubs and set up detention centers for returnees. Yet leaders of such organizations were left out of talks between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army. The International Crisis Group found that women’s organizations in Uganda were better connected and more active than comparable organizations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, which may have been a function of the fact that the women’s mobilization was more extensive in Uganda more generally and was more connected to networks in Africa and globally.

Some of the most palpable changes for women in Liberia were evident at the local level in interviews with women leaders and group members. As the leader of a Bomi women’s organization explained in a 2012 interview: “During the war we got to know our value because we were forced to find food for the children; men could not go out. When Ellen [Johnson-Sirleaf] took over, things changed for women. We praise God for the leaders God gave us. Women can speak anywhere [in public] now. In the past, women were in the back and were silent. If we did speak, nothing would happen. Women did not read and write. Now we speak well at meetings. We say what we want. I can speak well in front of men and women. Woman stayed at the back too long, and now we have decided to speak for ourselves. The voice of women should be heard. There are now more girls going to school in Bomi. Adult women can write their names. We have had ‘climate change.’ Now more women carry money, more women are in business. Women are now trading and doing business as far as Nigeria and Guinea. In the past they only did business in Liberia” (Tripp, forthcoming).

2. Changing International Norms Regarding Women’s Rights

A second factor that accounts for the timing of these developments in women’s rights has to do with changing international norms that have influenced donor, diplomatic, United Nations, and international nongovernmental organizations to expand women’s rights and representation (Strickland and Duvvury 2003). Those countries that have been most donor dependent have tended
to be most keen to comply with CEDAW, UNSCR 1325, and other such international treaties and resolutions. Eritrea and oil wealthy Angola, for example, have been more removed from these international influences and less inclined to succumb to these pressures to address women’s rights concerns, although even these two countries adopted legislative quotas for women.

Thus, the decline of conflict and changing international norms regarding women’s rights help explain why postconflict countries experienced more rapid changes in women’s rights regimes than other non-postconflict countries after the 1990s and not earlier. The factors that explain the most immediate changes can be found in 1) the emergence of autonomous women’s rights movements, many as an outgrowth of peace movements or in response to the problems exacerbated by war; 2) disruptions in gender relations as a result of conflict; 3) donor pressures for gender change motivated by new international norms and, to a lesser extent, 4) women’s rights language in peace agreements. The first two factors are primarily an outgrowth of conflict, the second two are an outgrowth of changing normative international gender regimes. All these intervening factors, in turn, influenced later medium term outcomes for women of constitutional and legislative changes incorporating women’s rights as well as levels of women’s representation in parliaments.

3. Regime Type

The proportion of democracies in the world increased by 19 percent in the “third wave of democratization” between 1975 and 2005 based on analysis of Freedom House data. The qualitative literature on Latin America and East Europe has generally shown that democratization did not produce the gender equality outcomes that were hoped for (Waylen 2007, Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Gal and Kligman). However, the literature on Africa (Fallon 2003, Lindberg 2004, Bauer and Britton 2006) and Asia (Lee 2000; Clark and Lee 2000) showed more positive outcomes for women in this regard. New quantitative crossnational longitudinal research shows that democracy itself does not influence levels of women’s political representation, but it does influence increases in women’s political representation over time by creating the political space in which women can organize to press for increased representation (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010). These findings were replicated for African cases (Tripp and Hughes 2010). If political representation is taken as one measure of gender equality, one may extrapolate from this that modest levels of democratization may have initially opened up space for women to mobilize in countries coming out of conflict.

Nevertheless, in contrast to earlier studies drawing on data prior to 1995, more recent static cross-sectional crossnational analyses do not show a correlation between women’s representation and levels of democracy globally (Paxton 1997; Tripp and Kang 2005). This is because there are a large number hybrid regimes (neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic) and authoritarian regimes that have adopted quotas and increased female representation. This is particularly evident in Africa, where between 1975 and 2005 hybrid states increased by 17 percent, while authoritarian countries decreased by 36 percent. While the trend toward political liberalization was constrained in these regimes, it nevertheless had implications for much of the continent.

Globally, most postconflict countries today are hybrid regimes. In the short and medium term one sees in these countries increased numbers of women in parliament, in courts, and in the executive. One even sees the adoption of many woman friendly policies. But the evidence is too thin to conclude at this time that these changes have resulted in significant substantive changes
in women’s lives in the long term. In some countries, the postconflict moment is too recent to draw such conclusions. Many countries, for example, adopt women’s rights policies because they wish to improve their image internationally, give the appearance of being modern, and distinguish themselves from more conservative or fundamentalist political elements. They sometimes adopt quotas to expand their patronage networks. It is less clear how committed they are to really improving women’s status.

One of the main debates in the postconflict literature has to do with the extent to which democracy matters in these contexts. Another related debate has to do with the extent to which the lack of democracy constrains what the women elected to reserved seats can do once in office. Much of this debate has focused on Rwanda. Some have suggested that the large numbers of women in the Rwandan legislature have both improved prospects for democracy in Rwanda and for improving women’s rights in Rwanda. Others, like Carey Hogg (2009), argue that the ruling party, Revolutionary Patriotic Front (RPF), has created a situation in which the women parliamentarians are there to represent women in what she considers an essentialist manner. She argues that this construction has contributed to an ethnic equation the privileges Tutsi over Hutu.

Devlin and Elgie (2008) claim that increased representation of women in Rwanda has had little impact on women’s rights policy outputs. Similarly, Jenie Burnett (2008, 2011) is concerned that as women’s representation has increased, its ability to influence policy has decreased. She highlights the 2003 land bill and the inability of parliamentarians to influence the bill in a way that would help women. She sees the benefits of the heightened female representation as primarily symbolic, devoted more to the consequences of sexual violence than to its causes, such as poverty, land conflict, hostile civil–military relationships, disorganization of the army and the police, weakness of the justice system, physical and economic insecurity, and oppressive gender norms.

Research in Sudan, has shown similar limitations of the lack of democracy on women’s ability to use their representation to advance a women’s rights agenda: Liv Tønnessen found that the 25% quota introduced in 2008 was the result of advocacy by women activists and international NGOs. They seized on the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the language of UNSCR 1325 as an opportunity to push for quotas. However, the lack of democracy has acted as a serious constraint on the advancement of any pro-women’s rights measures (Abbas 2010, Tønnessen 2011).

4. Economic Factors

Economic conditions also influence gender equality outcomes. This comes through in almost all crossnational studies on political representation, which show that countries with higher levels of economic growth tend to do better in terms of women’s rights (Hughes 2009; Viterna et al. 2008; Tripp and Kang 2006; Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Reynolds, 1999). This has implications for postconflict countries, which tend to have lower GDP levels out of virtue of having recently come out of conflict. This reality, along with unmet expectations of change, may act as a constraint on advancing women’s rights. However, postconflict countries also have some of the fastest economic growth rates in their regions because of the baseline from which they generally have started. According to the IMF (2012), six of the fastest growing economies are fairly recent post-conflict countries and six are in Africa.
Some of the fastest growing economies in Africa were postconflict economies. Liberia’s economy, for example, has experienced a strong recovery in two decades with 6.9% GDP real growth rates in 2011 and 9% expected for 2012. The country has enjoyed single digit inflation — the lowest rates in three decades — and inflation is expected to continue to decline. The government’s national budget has grown by 400% since 2006. GDP levels have more than doubled between 2003 and 2008. The same is true of Nepal, which doubled its GDP in that same period as did Sri Lanka and East Timor, according to World Bank indicators.

While one cannot make assumptions about growth being equally enjoyed across the population nor of it trickling down, nevertheless greater relative security and stability generally creates conditions for improved economic welfare. Economic well-being also provides states with resources with which to implement gender policies. How these influence women’s rights in postconflict countries is largely not understood, particularly when oil and other valuable natural resources are factored into the equation.

The mechanisms linking economic development with positive gender outcomes in non-postconflict countries may not necessarily apply in postconflict and fragile countries. Inglehart and Norris (2003), however, argue that modernization, economic development, and the emergence of a postindustrial society lead to cultural change, which in turn transforms gender roles resulting in greater female political representation together with the development of democratic institutions. It is unclear to what extent such dynamics are at work in postconflict contexts that are undemocratic. Therefore, we need more research to better understand which causal mechanisms are at work in postconflict countries.

B. Drivers of Change

1. Women’s Movements

One key driver of change in women’s rights in postconflict countries has been the emergence of new autonomous women’s movements in Africa, especially after the 1990s. In postconflict countries these movements emerged in the context of the war and, in some countries, as part of peace movements (e.g., Sierra Leone and Liberia), in other countries they emerged after the conflict was over (e.g., Uganda).

Uganda was the first country in Africa representing the recent trends described in this report linking conflict with women’s rights. After the war, women activists put pressure on the government to increase women’s political representation and expand women’s rights more generally after Uganda gained relative peace in 1986. They drew inspiration from the UN conferences on women in Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995) as well as regional meetings of women activists from East Africa and elsewhere in Africa. They also took advantage of the political opening that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s to mobilize independent women’s organizations and press their demands. The number of women national legislators jumped from 1% in 1980 to 18% in 1989 after quotas were introduced to 37.2% in 2012. Women’s presence in the cabinet increased from 0% in 1980 to 10% in 2001 and 28% in 2012 and women came to hold key ministerial positions. Uganda had the first woman vice president in Africa from 1994-2003. By 2000, the 14% of all Supreme Court judges were female; women held 25% of all positions in the Court of Appeals, 26% in the High Court and they represented 30% of chief magistrates (FOWODE 2000, 30).

The nonpartisan Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Association, with the help of the women’s
movement, has been instrumental in passing legislation affecting women with respect to refugee rights, employment, equal opportunities, defilement, domestic violence, female genital cutting, trafficking, sexual exploitation of women during conflict, disability rights, maternity leave (increasing days off), land, National Plan of Action on Women 2007 (the first such National Gender Policy was passed in 1997). In 2007, a constitutional court struck down key provisions of the Succession Act regarding women’s right to inherit property, Divorce Act, Penal Code Act, and made ruling that decriminalized adultery for women. There are still important gaps in legislation, particularly with respect to marriage and divorce.

Although some of the most dramatic changes have been in the political arena, the changes went well beyond. The women’s movement put pressure around education policies and subsequently we have seen the proportion of girls in primary schools increase from 44.2% in 1990 to 49.8% in 2006. Women make up half the students in leading institutions of higher education as a result of affirmative action policies promoted by women’s organizations. Even some of the most reluctant sectors of society are changing their views towards women. Today, traditional leaders are engaging gender issues, e.g., land disputes, inheritance, bride price, gender-based violence. In a country like Uganda, some of the most important impacts of the increase in women's political representation have been symbolic in terms of what they did for the ability of women to imagine a different reality for themselves. Not only did women envision political power, but also the possibility of running businesses, universities, religious and other non-government institutions. Although many gaps in legislation and implementation still exist, Uganda has experienced significant momentum to transform women’s status (Tamale 1999, Tripp 2000, Tripp and Kwasiga 2002).

The women’s movement eventually lost steam, disillusioned by the lack of progress in key areas, such as land and domestic relations legislation. The movement also became increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress in democratizing the country, which eventually soured their relations with the government and ruling party. Nevertheless, the movement has been a critical force in bringing about important changes for Ugandan women (Matembe 2002).

In other countries like Sierra Leone and South Sudan, there was a weak history of women’s activism prior to the conflict. The period of conflict was the first time women mobilized to make political demands. In Northern Sudan, where a long tradition of women’s activism had been experiencing a period of repression, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement process created a space for women to regroup and mobilize to make claims for political inclusion (Abbas 2010, Abusharaf 2005, Bender 2011, Erickson and Faria 2011, Hillhorst and van Leeuwen, McFerson 2011, Tønnesen 2011).

In Liberia, the women’s movement was galvanized during the war (AWPSG 2004). The government of Liberia has been committed to promoting gender equality, also as a result of the women’s movement. Much of the pressure initially came from the women involved in the peace movement, which morphed into a women’s movement after the war (Fuest 2008, 2010). Femocrats pushed for change from above, supported by a president who has been strongly committed to gender equality and has ties to the women’s movement. As a result of pressure from women’s groups as well as international actors, the government is in the process of developing a gender policy and creating a National Gender Forum to lead its policy in this area. Already there are a number of policies in place, including a national gender-based violence plan of action, a gender based violence secretariat within the Ministry of Gender and Development.
The legislature passed a rape law in 2005 and an inheritance act in 2003, which allows women to inherit property in both statutory and customary marriages without interference from the husband’s family. The Government was also working with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to review national laws for bias or discrimination against women.

Liberia has established a national secretariat for women's NGOs to coordinate the work of women's organizations. Under the leadership of Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Ministry of Gender launched a campaign against rape with the slogan “No sex for help. No help for sex. Sex is not a requirement for jobs, grades, medical treatment or other services.” Teachers who sexually harassed girls in schools are to be suspended without pay for five years, or indefinitely, depending on the seriousness of the offence. No other country in Africa has had such aggressive leadership at this level in an effort to end violence against women and address other issues affecting women. The movement has been frustrated by the lack of progress with a bill that would give them a gender quota and continues to lobby around this issue (Tripp forthcoming).

Thus, autonomous women’s movements are a key part of the explanation for change, while the lack of such movements in countries like Angola, Chad and Eritrea helps explain, in part, why change in key areas has been so slow if nonexistent in those countries.

2. International Donor Pressures

Post-conflict countries are generally more easily influenced by international influences and new norms relating to gender due to the prominent presence and influence of external actors, particularly in the form of peace keeping troops and donor aid. These norms permeated and spread through international institutions from the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the International Criminal Court and UNSCR 1325 (Anderlini 2011).

Donor assistance is a major impetus for norm diffusion, making more dependent postconflict countries most likely to comply with these norms. Sara Bush (2010), for example, has shown that the presence of a UN peace operation supporting political liberalization, the amount of foreign aid, and whether a country has international election monitors, is positively and significantly correlated with the adoption of gender quotas.

The table below presents the net ODA received per capita in 2009. One way of measuring international influence is the amount of aid received per capita (Table 3 below). Countries with greater wealth like Angola are more insulated from these external pressures. Other countries like Eritrea isolated themselves from these pressures as a result of their authoritarian rule. This table helps explain why countries like Angola, Chad, Eritrea and DR Congo have not been as eager to comply with international norms as countries like Liberia or Rwanda or Mozambique. Angola, Chad and Eritrea have also not had strong independent women’s movements and therefore they were virtually immune to pressures for gender reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ODA per Capita ($)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fragile states receiving the largest amount of aid addressing gender equality include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, DRC, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Palestinian administration areas, Cameroon and Nepal. Based on data for 2007-08, aid that supported gender equality as a significant objective in fragile states amounted to approximately USD 4.4 billion per year or 34% of total aid in these countries, while USD $683 million (15% of the total) targeted gender equality as the “principal” (main) objective. The countries providing the greatest proportion of gender equality funding included (in proportion of amount) New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, France, and Belgium (OECD-DAC 2010). However, it is important to note that it is not gender aid per se that makes a difference. Rather, it is the amount of overall aid and the relationship of the country to the international community that is of greatest importance in driving change. Thus, it is not gender related aid that matters, but rather the ways in which particular countries engage and are beholden to the international community, thus making them vulnerable to gender norms.

International influences had impacts that went beyond resources. Manchanda (2005) points out that in the case of Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, the international community played a critical role in ensuring that women were represented at the peace talks, even if they were not integral to them. Women in southern Sri Lanka lobbied the rebel forces LTTE (Liberation Forces of Tamil Eelam) and government of Sri Lanka to participate in the talks and received important backing from the international community, which subsequently collapsed.

In some cases, individual international actors were able to significantly influence gender outcomes. In Sierra Leone UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Daudi Mwakawogo was described as especially committed to gender mainstreaming (Date-Bah 2006, 20). However, it was rarely, if ever, donor influences alone that made a difference. It was a combination of their efforts together with local women’s rights activists that were critical in bringing about change. It also should be pointed out that even though countries might be heavily under donor influence when it came to women’s rights, they were sometimes adversely impacted by the ways in which funds were disbursed. For example, a study of UNSCR 1325 implementation in Liberia found that while funders made a difference, their orientation to short-term and medium projects sometimes limited the capacity of organizations to plan and forced them into ad hoc activities. Local activists constantly had worry about donor fatigue and fads (Ceasar et al. 2010).

Castillejo (2010) found that the constitutional provisions and women’s lobbying were crucial in the passage of Sierra Leone’s gender bills and Burundi’s inheritance bill, however donor support was also critical in these countries that were highly donor dependent. Miriam Anderson (2010b) documents how earlier Burundian and regional women activists rallied support from UNIFEM in New York to get them seats at the peace talks. They also gained considerable support from women’s groups in Africa, and in particular, from South African activists. In December 1997, Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS) organized meetings with Burundian women’s NGOs to help them gain awareness about the role they might play in peacebuilding activities (Femmes Africa Solidarité 2001, 18).

One other political opportunity structure at the international level that had consequences later on was the inclusion of women’s rights language in international treaties. Other research on
peace agreements has focused on the inclusion of women’s rights concerns into the agreements. Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database, Miriam Anderson (2010) found that of the 148 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2005, at least 38 (30%) contain explicit references to women. Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke (2011) developed a Transitional Justice Peace Agreements Database of 585 peace agreements in 102 peace processes and found that the number of agreements that mentioned women increased from 32% to 43% with the introduction of UNSCR 1325. One can see from the table below using an even longer time from United Nations data that there is a big jump in adoption of a variety of peace agreements after 2000 when comparing the 1949-2000 period with the 2000-2005 period. African peace agreements had proportionately the greatest percentage of such references to women’s rights for all time periods, which speaks perhaps both to the undue importance of international pressures in this region that has experienced not only more conflicts than any other region, but also some of the most devastating wars.

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<tr>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interstate</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>7</td>
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Source: UN peacemaker: http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php

Nevertheless, in specific areas like sexual violence there are major lapses. Jenkins and Goetz (2010) found in a review of 300 peace agreements in 45 conflicts from 1989 to 2008 that only 18 accords relating to just ten conflicts mention sexual violence or other forms of gender-based violence. Because of such omissions, UN Security Council resolution 1820 (passed in 2008), calls for internationally mediated peace talks to address conflict-related sexual violence.

**Secondary Drivers**

Secondary drivers are actors that are generally responding to pressures from the primary drivers and are inconsistent in their commitment and capacity to press for gender equality. They don’t initiate changes on their own, but they become drivers as a result of policy, pressure, and/or popular opinion.

**3. Peacekeeping Forces**

In the case of Timor Leste, several studies showed how international norms of women’s rights and gender equality were implemented as a result of alliances between local and international actors (Hall 2009). They were particularly evident in the case of peacekeeping operations, which according to Louise Olsson (2007), manifested themselves in the concept of “security equality “or the equal distribution of protection to men and women.” Power-relations became more equal during the UN operation from 1999 to 2002 and particularly up until 2002, when the peacekeeping forces were most active. These improved levels of awareness had been generated by Timorese women’s groups working together with the operation’s Gender Unit, particularly after 2000. The end result was an increase in Timorese women’s participation in politics and
improved protection from domestic violence. During the first half of the INTERFET/UNTAET peacekeeping operations, men’s security improved as their political situation improved since they were primarily affected by violence relating to the conflict. The successes of the peacekeeping troops in Timor Leste continued between 2002 and 2007 as a result of useful synergies between local and international NGOs and UN agencies. This was particularly evident in the activities around domestic violence. Female fighters morphed into a women’s movement in a short period of time. However, the norm diffusion was not extended to the state, which refused to approve the domestic violence law and harmonize it with the penal code (Hall 2009).

Women’s security did not improve until non-conflict violence was addressed. Elizabeth Thompson (1999) showed this to be the case in the Lebanese and Syrian struggles for independence in which women’s involvement in military operations was instrumental in bringing about women’s right to vote. Similar patterns were also seen in the UN operation in Namibia (1989-90), which had an informal equivalent to the Gender Unit. Related dynamics were evident in the case of Cambodia (1992-93) under the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, where political opening introduced greater freedom of organization and greater advocacy around gender equality. Similar effects were also noted from the operation in Mozambique (Jacobson 2005) and South Africa in 1992-1994 (Steihm 1997). These changes in peacekeeping operations were related to an awareness of gender in implementation of the mandate, the role of operation leaders, and holding of focus groups among the populations within which the operation worked. Missions that did not have this awareness met with less success (e.g., UN Mission to Bosnia Herzegovina).

4. Women’s Policy Agencies

Most postconflict countries have Women’s Policy Agencies (sometimes referred to as national machineries). In general, they tend to be fairly ineffectual in pushing a women’s rights agenda, but they are worth mentioning because in cases they have helped give visibility to women’s movement agendas and have been a presence in influencing change, however weak. They generally purport to mainstream gender into macro-economic policy frameworks and in sector policies; review constitutions and laws; enact new gender-equity related laws; organize training and capacity building programs, and collect gender-disaggregated data. A few countries have gender budgeting initiatives and are engaged in national planning initiatives (Warioba 2004, 13). In many countries, particularly fragile states, they tend to be underfunded, lacking in capacity, and marginalized within the government. Gender mainstreaming and the use of gender focal points within the ministries often have become a means of diluting the focus on gender as these positions are poorly funded and staffed by junior personnel. This has meant that the focal points do not have sufficient authority to provide leadership to the ministries in gender related activities (Kwesiga 2003, 206). All too frequently, the lack of capacity in the WPAs has led to tensions with women’s organizations, which regard the agencies were competing with them for resources and control.

5. Political Parties

As in democracies, parties in postconflict countries that were more left leaning have tended to be more open to advancing women’s rights (e.g., Unified Communist Party of Nepal, FRELIMO in Mozambique, South West African People’s Organisation in Namibia). Even in the 1970s and 1980s some of the highest rates of female representation were found in postcountries with left-

24
leaning parties in power, like Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. This pattern is still evident, but its importance has diminished over time as non-left leaning parties have adopted quotas and promote women’s rights policies. Moreover, changes in international norms have put pressure on parties of all persuasions to increase representation of women and advance the status of women (Tripp and Hughes 2010).

6. The Executive

Changes in women’s rights advancement have occurred where presidents and leaders in postconflict contexts have expressed the political will to advance women’s rights (e.g., Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda). However, without active independent women’s movements, these changes cannot be counted upon. Moreover, the lack of democracy and imperatives of patronage have meant that this political will is unreliable, as evident in the literature on Rwanda (Burnet 2008, 2011, Hogg 2009) and Uganda (Tamale 1999). The danger is that women leaders become coopted to serve the interests of the ruling party rather than to espouse a women’s rights agenda. These leaders can also easily reverse their policies, as was the case with key clauses in land legislation protecting women’s inheritance rights which were removed from legislation that had already been passed (Matembe 2002).

C. Strategies and Institutional Interventions

Following the UN’s usage, peacebuilding and statebuilding are seen a continuum of measures aimed at reducing the risk of return to conflict by strengthening national capacity for conflict management and laying the foundations for durable peace and development. The following section explores strategies used to influence peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in improving the status of women. This is followed by a discussion of their impacts.

1. Peace Negotiations

There is a small literature on the extent to which women have been involved in peace negotiations as well as their exclusions from such talks (Keyiza Layinwa, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, C. Barnes and T. Polzer, Enid Burke, Jennifer Klot, Bunting Ikaweba, M. Fleshman).

A 2009 UNIFEM report (cited in Jenkins and Goetz 2010) found in a review of 24 major peace processes since 1992 that only 2.1 per cent of signatories to peace deals were women; and that roughly 7.1 percent of the time women were included in negotiating delegations in the 14 cases for which such information was available. No women had been appointed chief or lead peace mediators in UN-sponsored peace talks. In the case of northern Uganda, UNIFEM funding and advocacy helped women participate in the Juba talks (O’Connell 2012).

New scholarship now argues that civil society, including women’s organizations, can make a difference in enhancing peace outcomes (Barnes 2002; Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Belloni 2008; Koppell 2007; McKeon 2005). According to Nilsson, civil society is often seen as bringing added legitimacy to the process. They may be consulted, brought into the talks and used to intervene at the grassroots level to engage populations. Barnes, for example, showed how in Mali, the engagement of civil society at the grassroots level had important consequences for bringing about peace.
It has been well established that countries coming out of war are most at risk for returning to conflict. Between 1944 and 1997 at least half the civil wars that ended returned to conflict (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007). Countries that have been engaged in war have a 44% chance of returning to conflict within 5 years and are 10 times more likely to return to war right after the war ended when compared with when it started (Collier et al. 2003, 83, 104). The probability that they revert to war can be mediated, some have argued, by peace agreements (Walter 2001), the use of peacekeeping forces (Sambanis and Doyle 2000), by economic growth (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007), better implementation of rebel-military integration agreements (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008), and through the introduction of foreign aid resulting in local level institutional development (Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein 2009).

However, Nilsson’s new quantitative research has suggested that civil society can also play a major role in influencing the outcomes for peace. This has major implications for work on women in peace talks. Out of 83 peace agreement since the end of the Cold War, 28 or 34% have included at least one civil society actor. Nilsson (2012) finds that if civil society actors are included in peace agreements, the risk of peace failing is reduced by 64%. These findings held across regime type. What is now needed is scholarship that examines the mechanisms and causal pathways of these findings.

These crossnational studies are reinforced by accounts by women peace activists themselves who describe the ways in which they influenced peace talks in countries like Burundi and Liberia, as constrained as they were. They had to be persistent and forceful, and they needed to work as a unified movement in order to impact the talks (UNIFEM 2001, African Women and Peace Support Group 2004).

2. Peace Activism and Informal Peacemaking

There has been very little written about the role of peace movements and civil society in peacemaking. This literature is largely anecdotal, non-academic, sparse, and interspersed within other broader literatures. It is entirely descriptive and non-systematic. It includes references to such strategies as organizing rallies and boycotts, promoting small arms confiscation, reconciliation ceremonies, negotiating with small groups of rebels to disarm, and negotiating with rebels to release abducted children and child soldiers. Other strategies during war range from collecting arms to media work, especially through the radio (Tripp et al. 2009, see also case study of Liberia in Box below).

For example, journalist Els de Temmerman has written the harrowing story of how an Italian deputy headmistress secured the release of the majority of 139 girls who were captured by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. Numerous newspapers accounts have subsequently detailed the activities of Angelina Atyam and other mothers of the Aboke girls who formed Concerned Parents Association to raise international awareness of the abductions and continue to negotiate with the LRA for their release (Lacy 2003).

When conflict erupted in Kenya following the 2007 elections, human rights and women’s organizations were at the forefront of monitoring the violence, speaking out against it and taking measures to deescalate tensions. During conflicts, women’s groups intervened directly with combatants at the local level in attempting to persuade them to disarm (e.g., Mali, Liberia). Although poorly represented at peace talks, women negotiators, women’s groups and civil society actors nevertheless pressed for a more rapid end to conflict in Liberia and DR Congo at peace negotiations. Women lobbied both national, regional, as well as international actors in
almost all cases.

In Angola, civil society organizations, including women’s groups prevented an escalation of conflict at a crucial moment at the end of the conflict, when the government threatened to decimate the vanquished rebel movement of UNITA after the death of its leader Jonas Savimbi. Societal peace mediators sought to bring contending parties together through behind-the-scenes negotiations (Campbell 2001, Comerford 2005). The peace movement in Angola had emerged in 1998 and was made up primarily of Angolan churches, the private media, civic organizations, some NGOs, women’s organizations, and the coalition of 14 opposition parties.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women’s Informal Mobilization: The Case of Liberia</th>
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<td>During the Liberia civil wars, women organized marches, petitions, and prayer meetings held weekly in Christian and Muslim religions institutions throughout the country. From the outset, the women’s peace movement included Christian, Muslim, rural and urban women as well as women of different ethnicities. They were involved in keeping the households going, finding food, keeping their children safe, and hiding men from being conscripted into the various armies. Market women risked their lives and bravely navigated dozens of checkpoints to bring food into Monrovia. At checkpoints, women faced intimidation, demands for bribery, sometimes even rape or death at the hands of the soldiers and militia. Women maintained communication across enemy lines.</td>
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<td>During the first 1989-1996 war, the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI), Concerned Women of Liberia, Women in Action for Goodwill, the Muslim Women’s Federation, Women’s Development Association of Liberia, the Federation of Liberian Women and the National Women’s Commission of Liberia worked together to support communities through food distribution, catering for internally displaced peoples, providing trauma counseling, organizing basic literacy programs, and running healing and reconciliation workshops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The initial focus of women’s mobilization was disarmament and they opposed the holding of elections without disarmament. They collected and confiscated small arms. Women’s associations acted as monitors to see that promises were kept. The LWI mobilizers also attended regional peace talks and engaged in letter writing campaigns with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Groups like the Coalition of Political Parties Women in Liberia (COPPWIL) were formed to explicitly forge a common agenda across party and ethnic lines around women’s rights concerns. Women’s organizations also networked with Liberians in the diaspora and kept the international community informed about their goals.</td>
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<td>A community leader, Esther, described women’s role in the fighting:</td>
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<td>The women decided to talk to boys in the bush to get the rebels to put down their guns down. We had fasted and prayed throughout the war. Women played a major role in bringing the war to an end. We were the cause for peace to enter into this country. We talked to men to be calm for elections. We put the president in; she won because of us. We were more involved than men in making peace. We talked to our brothers and sons who were fighting. We carried food to the rebels and convinced them to stop fighting. If you did not go with food they would kill you. We brought palm oil, sugar cane, and rice. We told them, “Put your arms so we can have an election. . . .” (Interview with author, October 2007).</td>
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<td>Another described the rhetoric they used to persuade the fighters:</td>
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<td>We took white chicken, kola nut in hand, palm necklace and said to the boys, “We bore you, nursed you, raised you. Put down your arms.” About 100 women went at a time. We used many strategies with young boys. Women went and spoke with the boys in their own languages. Bassa talked Bassa language, Mano talked with Mano boys, Gio, Kpelle, Mandingo with their own boys in dialects (Interview with author, October 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>White chickens were used in lieu of white doves and served as symbols of peace. Kola nuts were reminders of women</td>
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The first efforts by women to attend peace talks came in December 1994 when women’s delegations tried to participate in the Accra Clarification Conference. They were initially kept out of the conference, but as a result of wide coverage of this exclusion in the Ghanaian media, women’s organizations were allowed to participate as official observers on the second day and by the third day they had official participant status. Encouraged by this initial victory, hundreds of women came together and drafted a position statement on the impact of the Liberian war on women and their communities. Women leaders used the statement as a mandate in order to gain access to the peace negotiations. They raised funds to travel to the various peace negotiations and were able to send a delegation of three women to the ECOWAS heads of state mediation committee in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 1995. President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana allowed the women to speak even though they were not officially on the program.

One important West African regional network that emerged in this period was the Mano River Union Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET) of women activists from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. Its leader Theresa Leigh-Sherman made a presentation in which she demanded representation of women in the peace negotiations: “Our lack of representation in the ongoing peace process is equivalent to the denial of one of our fundamental rights: the right to be seen, be heard, and be counted. This [denial] also deprives the country [of] access to the opinion of 51% of its human resources in solving the problems, which affect our lives as a people” (AWPSG 2004, 27).

Liberian women continued to mobilize across differences when fighting again flared in the 1999-2003 war. Women’s associations took to the streets in 2003 when fighting between government forces and those of Liberians United for Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) intensified. Multireligious groups of women not only demonstrated in the streets, they also organized a sit-in at the airfield in Sinkor and went there on a daily basis to pray, sing, dance, cry and advocate for peace. Dressed in white T-shirts and head scarves to symbolize peace, they demanded a neutral peacekeeping force that would allow refugees to return home and called for free and fair elections. They also called for the strengthening of Monrovia’s infrastructure since it was unable to accommodate the thousands of refugees who were returning home.

The Liberian chapter of MARWOPNET participated in the ECOWAS peace talks at Akosombo and Accra from June through August 2003. MARWOPNET was given accreditation to attend the Accra conference and had an eight-member delegation. Women’s organizations on the outside of the talks had a strong ally in Ellen-Johnson-Sirleaf, who kept them informed and consulted with them. In fact, Johnson-Sirleaf, who was to become Liberia’s next elected president, was one of the most forceful negotiators. The women demanded greater civil society participation in the talks, 50% representation in the Transitional Government and voting rights in the peace talks. They called for an immediate cease-fire since violence had been escalating in Monrovia. MARWOPNET called on the UN Security Council to provide for a peacekeeping force and the establishment of a transition government that would “disarm, demobilize, reintegrate and resettle troops, prepare the way for elections, provide humanitarian relief, or for reconciliation and restructure the army and security forces” (AWPSG 2004, 49).

Over 45 women’s groups that were attending the peace talks hammered out a position chapter at the Golden Tulip Hotel in Accra on August 15, 2003. They demanded that women had to be included in all proposed institutions within the new Liberian government and within all structures that would lead the post-conflict peace building process. They also drew on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 31, 2000, which “Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective.”

Because of the important mediation role MARWOPNET had played between the various factions involved in the peace talks, the network became one of the signatories of a peace agreement as witness to the agreement signed on 18 August 2003 by the Government of Liberia, LURD, MODEL and all the 18 political parties. The talks resulted in the setting up of a transitional government that was installed 15 October 2003 and for the presence of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which arrived two weeks before the transitional government of Gyude Bryant took over. Thus, women made modest gains in the peace negotiations, but more importantly, they helped speed up the process that brought the talks to conclusion.

workshops, participating in campaigns for clean diamonds and protesting the role of coltan in the conflict in DR Congo. While they were hardly the sole cause of the decline in conflict, civil society groups, including women, certainly played a key role. There is a lack of literature on these activities, which is more telling of the gaps in the literature than an absence of women’s engagement in informal peace activities.

3. International Pressures: Treaties and UN Resolutions

At the international level, strategies to advance women’s rights included efforts to adopt policies at the level of the United Nations to influence government policies. The best example of these were efforts to pass UNSCR 1325 along with other resolutions and treaties pertaining to women’s involvement in peacebuilding institutions. A great amount of attention has been paid to problems with the way in which UNSCR 1325 has been framed, for example, its exclusion of references to security for men. Critics like Laura Shepherd have pointed out that the resolution implies that only women are to be protected from violence. It refers to armed conflict, although women and people more generally may experience many heightened forms of violence that do not always involve armed conflict, e.g., domestic violence. Critics argue that it is unclear how conflict situations differ from “normal” situations. Women are relegated to national mobilizing, even though it is evident from the examples provided in the previous section on informal mobilization, that women mobilized at all levels, including the regional and international levels. Gender equality is seen as the advancement of women, regardless of the fact that women also participate in structures that oppress other women and men (Shepherd 2008, Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011). Some, for example, have critiqued UNSCR 1325 for not referencing the structural dimensions of women’s inequality and delinking gender mainstreaming from gender equality, thereby gutting the resolution of any feminist political content (Otto 2009, Onyejekwe 2005). Country level documents relating to UNSCR 1325 still refer to women as victims.

Willett (2010) finds that ten years after its adoption, UNSCR 1325 remains more rhetoric than a real commitment. She argues that what is needed is greater funding, major restructuring of UN bodies, changes in the highly militarized culture of peacekeeping operations, and serious gender mainstreaming. Others also find that the resolution does not reference any accountability mechanisms to monitor its implementation and set benchmarks to measure progress (Otto 2009). Moreover, the resolution’s actual impact has been hampered by the fact that the UN Security Council resolutions are not binding and only apply to UN bodies (Tachou-Sipowo 2010). Some highlight the staff, funding and enforcement deficiencies in the implementation of UNSCR in peacekeeping operations in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone (Nduka-Agwua 2009, Boehme 2009).

A number of authors, however, are more optimistic about the impact of UNSCR 1325. Renee Black (2009), for example, found that prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, references to women in conflict in country specific UN resolutions were sporadic and inconsistent, and tended to refer to women primarily as victims. Since the passage of UNSCR 1325, there has been a dramatic increase in resolutions referring to women and signs that gender mainstreaming is becoming more routinized within the Security Council. This can be attributed to efforts of NGOs like PeaceWomen and various agencies like UNIFEM and INSTRAW, which have attempted to hold the Security Council accountable to its commitments in UNSCR 1325. Donald Steinberg, currently deputy administrator at United States Agency for International Development (USAID), finds that the language of UNSCR 1325 could be stronger, but defends the resolution, saying that there has been noticeable change in UN structures since its adoption, more awareness of
the issues, more gender advisers, more gender training of peacekeepers, and use of excellent guidelines for field action (2010).

At the international level, “women, peace and security” concerns are now an accepted part of the normative peacebuilding efforts of institutions like the UN Peacebuilding Commission, but they still rely on key individuals who are committed to promoting women in strategic policy development (Tryggestad 2010). Senior women engaged in UN peace processes are ten times more likely to promote women in peace processes than their male colleagues (Conway and Shoemaker 2008, Tinde 2009). The UN Security Council has been forced to gender mainstream its operations and adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation or abuse of civilians during peacekeeping operations.

4. Transitional Justice Strategies

The term “transitional justice” is a fairly recent one, having emerged in the context of transitions from authoritarianism in Eastern Europe and Central America in the late 1980s and early 1980s. It originally had to do with the dilemma of how to deal with the human rights abuses of predecessor authoritarian regimes (Bell 2009). The goals of transitional justice are to bring to light the truth of crimes from the perspective of the victims and give them a public forum, end impunity by making perpetrators accountable, provide victims with compensation or reparations, improve rule of law and institutional reform, promote public dialogue and reconciliation, and strengthen the rule of law. Some theories of transitional justice regard it as ordinary justice, others see it as liberalizing, and yet others, as restorative.

Research in the area of gender and transitional justice has asked whether particular transitional justice mechanisms (e.g., truth commissions, United Nations tribunals, “hybrid” criminal courts, and domestic trials) can identify gendered violations and adequately redress victims. Scholarship has critiqued the poor conceptualization and enforcement of truth commission mandates, the inadequate implementation of international criminal law, and ill-conceived reparations and security sector reform (SSR) ventures from a gender perspective.

Much of the literature on commissions, for example, has dealt with the ways and extent to which women participated in the commissions, constraints on their participation, special accommodations for women’s testimony and other such concerns. In the truth commissions, for example, it has been a common observation that because of the social stigma or shame attached to gender based violence (GBV), and because of concerns about security and/or retaliation from perpetrators, women have understandably not been open about their experiences and have tended to focus on the experiences of others. This has meant that their concerns and experiences continue to remain hidden.

Very few scholars have asked what women survivors themselves wanted from the truth commissions. In the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) process, research found that although women wanted the warlords to be held accountable, they felt they had lied in the LTRC hearings and that the real healing, unity and forgiveness would have to take place at the local level. The women felt that addressing developmental needs in the community was more important than prosecutions of local people. They wanted first and foremost reparations, compensation for lost homes and livelihoods, development in their communities, and education for their children (Pillay, Speare and Scully 2010).
Others have focused on the concept of transitional justice itself to ask whether it can accommodate women’s needs with respect to justice (Bell 2009). The problem with most transitional justice approaches, according to Bell and O’Rourke (2007), is that they operate within a predetermined framework and with a priori assumptions about what the transition is “to”, where there is little room to reenvision a different outcome based on a deeper analysis of the economic and political sources of conflict.

**Women as Victims of Violence and Sexual Abuse in Conflict**

One of the most heavily covered topics in this entire field of transitional justice is that of violence and women, particularly sexual violence. This is evident also from analysis of keywords in this literature review and the pattern is evident regardless of literature type. Sexual violence was a central theme in 60% of the publications on violence and is mentioned in all articles regarding violence or transitional justice. There is a growing literature on rape and sexual abuse during conflict in specific countries (e.g., Dara Cohen, Meredith Turshen, Wenona Giles, Jennifer Hyndman), as well as new work on variation in sexual violence during conflict. Elisabeth Woods (2009), for example, looks at why the sexual violence was virtually absent in the case of the Tamil Tigers and Kathryn Farr (2009) at patterns of war rape. The literature on gender crimes as war crimes has been driven primarily by legal scholars, although area-based scholars have also entered some of the debates which have emerged in this field. 1 Additional attention has been paid to women’s testimonies in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions with the largest literature focusing primarily on the South African context, although there are other studies from Peru (Julissa Mantilla Falcón).

Laura Shepherd (2008) has developed one of the most extensive critiques of both conventional realistic notions of violence, but also feminist conceptions of violence. She argues that the *Violence Against Women literature* of the 1980s aimed at bringing attention to the different ways in which women experienced violence and conflict. It was aimed at highlighting the gravity of GBV. But in the process, women’s status as victim was overemphasized, while men were not seen as victims at all, not allowing for the possibility that men might also be victims of sexual violence. Women were infantilized and portrayed as vulnerable, while men were seen as active, aggressive, and controlling. Gender was pathologized as something that had to be negotiated, managed and overcome, with power being associated with masculinity.

The *Gender Violence approach* is associated with the work of Laura O’Toole, Jessica Schiffman, Caroline Moser, Fiona Clark, Cynthia Cockburn, and Veena Das and can be found in sociology, criminology, development, law and politics. This approach incorporates violence against men as well as lesbians and gay men. It adopts a constructivist perspective, in which gender is a social construct and in which sexed bodies are gendered. Gender violence rests on structural inequalities and needs to be tackled by transforming unequal power relations. There are no single acts of violence since they are all the creation of social norms, which themselves are created by violence. Violence is not just interpersonal; it operates at all levels.

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1 See, for example, work of Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Rhonda Copelon, Tamara Tompkins, Catherine MacKinnon, Danise Aydelott, Doris Buss, Donatella Lorch, Jennie Burnet, and Binaifer Nowrojee.

2 See, for example, work of Sheila Meintjes, Beth Goldblatt, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Fiona Ross, Elizabeth Mills.
Drawing on the work of Judith Butler, Laura Shepherd adopts an approach she terms “Violent Reproduction of Gender” in which she has brought the power dimensions of security to the fore. She sees gender as a form of identity that is a way of ordering society. Gender myths help maintain that ordering of society. She argues that our notion of power and violence is central to our understanding of gender. Changing and dynamic understandings of gender are reproduced and reconstituted through violence and insecurity. Violence is both gendered and gendering in that it is one of the sites where culturally and historically specific understandings of gender as a power relationship are reproduced (Shepherd 2008, 50). Thus, simply addressing the problem of violence against women does nothing to change the gendered order that is produced through violence. It means that action is merely directed at providing shelters, counseling and treating “victims,” but not tackling the broader issues of how security is conceptualized in the first place. One of the ways in which discourses of security function is to place the state as the boundary between the domestic and international spheres to protect internal and external sovereignty with the assumption that the state acts in the best interests of its citizens. Thus, the performance of gender is expressed through the performance of security and vice versa. Security is performative of a political order and therefore is inherently gendered and inherently violent.

While this discursive approach has enormous appeal in its unraveling of the connections between gender, violence and security, there still seems to be a lot of work to be done to move us from a discursive critique to a practice or policy that addresses the concerns raised by Shepherd. There is ample room here for gender theorists to work on applications and implications of such an approach for policy makers. Shepherd begins to do this with her critique of UNSCR 1325.

Some argue that the heavy emphasis on sexual violence has had problematic implications (Bouta et al. 2005). Severine Autesserre (2012), for example, claims that an overly simplified narrative of sexual abuse of women and girls in Eastern Congo has emerged from advocacy groups, journalists and policy makers that has created its own set of problems. Policy makers have focused on sexual violence in order to draw attention to the crisis in Congo in counter-productive ways. More attention is paid to sexual violence to the exclusion of other forms of violence that may be more prevalent. The narrative problematically feeds into an already existing stereotyped image of African savagery. Funds are available for victims of sexual abuse to the exclusion of other forms of violence that require attention. Most disturbingly, militia find that the intense focus on sexual violence makes it even more forbidden, creating additional incentives to exploit it, resulting in increases in sexual violence. The focus overlooks the fact that 4-10% of rape victims are men and boys. Her critique has gained considerable traction among scholars of Congo.

This critique was amplified by the Human Security Report 2012, which subsequently has come under sharp criticism from feminist international relations scholars. It argues that a series of prominent UN reports associated with the Security Council’s Women, Peace and Security policy agenda has not only brought attention to issues of sexual violence, but they have also helped foster a narrative based on partial, misleading and sometimes inaccurate assumptions. The report argues that sexual violence in the worst affected countries is treated as typical of all conflict-affected countries. It neglects domestic sexual violence even though it is more pervasive than conflict-related sexual violence. The report also concludes that “conflicts with extreme sexual violence are the exception rather than the rule,” and that claims otherwise are not
evidence based. Strategic rape is less common than purported.

Critics take issue with the Human Security Report’s claim that conflicts in Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Bosnia are exceptional cases, arguing that all wars feature sexual violence. They argue that there is insufficient data to know whether rape is increasing or decreasing or whether strategic rape is common (See, for example, MacKenzie 2012).

It seems, that rather than critique the intense focus on sexual violence, which seems warranted after decades of neglect, that it would be more appropriate to call for more attention in scholarship and policymaking to other forms of violence against women and men and the links between sexual and other forms of violence. The high levels of interest in sexual violence do raise real concerns which need to be considered by researchers and which are addressed at the end of the report (page 40). However, as Eva Ayiera (2010) has argued, the scholarship and policy interventions have tended to separate sexual violence against women from the broader culture of violence with the view it as an abnormality that will end when the conflict ends. It is not sufficiently linked to pre-existing gender relations and other forms of gendered violence prior to the conflict. Even sexual violence against men is tied to existing norms in which the assertion of male dominance is used to humiliate men by feminizing them. What is missing in this literature is an examination of the roots of gendered violence within broader political, social, economic dynamics.

Most of the literature on GBV is descriptive, country specific and examines causes that are particular to various contexts. Okello and Hovil (2007), for example, document chronically high rates of GBV in IDP camps in northern Uganda. They show that it is tied to the identity crisis men face with their inability to look after their families, resulting in alcohol abuse and violence against women. Murungu (2010) identifies key factors preventing reporting of GBV to police and health authorities in South Sudan that have to do with cultural dowry considerations, levels of education, access to health and legal facilities, corruption, family interventions to settle the matter, and a lack of confidentiality in handling such matters by authorities.

5. Strategies to Increase Political Representation of Women

Postconflict countries have double the rates of parliamentary representation compared with countries in all three world regions affected by conflict up until the 2000s (see Table 4). This is almost entirely related to the introduction of a variety of gender quotas. There have been basically three types of quotas introduced to influence legislative representation of women: 1) Reserved seats or women’s lists, mandated by constitutions or legislation or both, set aside seats that only women can compete for, guaranteeing from the outset that a predetermined percentage of seats are held by women. 2) Compulsory quotas require all parties to include a certain percentage of women on their candidate lists, but generally do not mandate where they should be placed on the list, which is crucial to the success of such a provision. 3) Finally, parties themselves may have voluntarily adopted a quota, regardless of whether there was a constitutional or legal mandate.

6. Constitutional and Legislative Reforms

Since the 1990s, women’s organizations in Africa have been advocating for constitutional reforms to protect their rights and increasingly, they have been successful in these efforts. In the 1990s, most sub-Saharan African constitutions were rewritten and, after 2000, another ten
were rewritten and six had major revisions. Only the constitutions of Botswana, Cameroon, Liberia, Mauritius, Guinea Bissau, Tanzanian and Zimbabwe remained unchanged in this period. East Timor adopted its first constitution in 2002 after independence from Portugal in 1975 and after Indonesian troops left in 1999. Nepal is governed by an interim constitution of 2007. As is evident in Section VI.B, post-conflict countries generally have been more inclined to adopt clauses favouring women’s rights than non-post conflict countries.

Post conflict countries have also generally been more aggressive than nonconflict countries in passing legislation pertaining to family law, violence against women, citizenship, property rights, quota laws, maternity leave, abortion, and female genital cutting. The extent to which these laws are applied is very uneven. They often are not implemented, largely due to a lack of resources and possibly lack of a political process. The next section examines the extent to which the aforementioned strategies have seen positive outcomes for women’s rights.

VI. OUTCOMES FOR WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

Clear short term and medium term impacts of women’s political empowerment in postconflict contexts are evident from new research and from analysis of literature on African countries coming out of conflict since the late 1980s, but especially after 2000. It shows that postconflict countries have tended to adopt more constitutional changes, legislation and policies regarding women’s rights when compared with countries that have not gone through conflict (Tripp et al. 2009). The postconflict countries examined in this study in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa have almost double the rates of legislative representation compared with countries that have not gone through conflict, largely due to the introduction of quota policies and legislation (See Table 4). This has happened primarily in countries that have had conflicts long in duration or high in intensity (high rates of death) (Hughes 2008; Tripp and Hughes 2010). These patterns are evident irrespective of type of conflict.

The adoption of women’s rights policies in the aftermath of conflict became especially evident after the 1990s and, strikingly, not at the end of conflicts in earlier periods. This has to do with the convergence of two factors: the aforementioned decline of conflict and changes in international norms regarding women’s rights (See Figure 3 of model). Conflict disrupted gender relations, especially at the local level. It gave rise to peace and/or women’s movements. At the same time, changes in gender equality norms globally gave rise to new donor and United Nations strategies. As conflicts came to an end, international donors and other international actors brought resources and political pressure to bear in the writing of peace agreements. The goals of the international actors converged with and reinforced those of the domestic women’s movements. These two actors were generally the main drivers of change.

Evidence from this literature assessment shows that secondary drivers who were influenced by them included in some cases political parties, the media, peacekeeping operations, women’s policy agencies, and powerful executives. Movements initially sought to influence peace processes and were sometimes able to get women’s rights language into peace agreements. Donors and international actors helped influence the gender policy within peacekeeping operations, which in the case of Timor Leste, for example, had positive impacts on women’s mobilization (Olsson 2007, Hall 2009). Later women’s organizations, supported by donors, sought to influence government, party, women’s policy agencies, and other leaders; and they sought to influence the media. This resulted in increased female representation in legislatures as well as constitutional and legislative changes regarding women’s rights (Figure 3). These pressures also resulted in short term attitudinal changes and medium term legislative, constitutional and policy changes in many
countries. The literature has generally not explored the extent to which the changes have had such real world consequences for women except for isolated cases and areas.

To explain the changes that have occurred, it is useful to draw on social movement theory. Herbert Kitschelt (1986) has argued that opportunity structures are specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate and constrain social movements. According to Kitschelt, they depend on the 1) “coercive, normative, remunerative and informational resources that an incipient movement can extract from its setting and can employ in its protest.” 2) They also depend on the institutional rules that government relations between people and decision makers; and 3) Openness depends on the appearance and disappearance of other movements.

In democracies four factors determine the openness of the regime to new demands: 1) “The number of political parties, factions and groups that effectively articulate different demands in electoral politics”; 2) “Capacity of legislatures to develop and control politics independently of the executive”; 3) “Patterns of intermediation between various interest groups and the executive branch”; 4) “Political openness not only requires opportunities for the articulation of new demands, but new demands must find their way into the process of forming policy compromises and consensus” (1986, 63).

Thus, it is important to look at both the influence of women’s movements as well as state responses to them. Building on the Herbert Kitschelt’s theory of social movement change, in post-conflict contexts — which are generally not democratic — the success of women’s movements has depended on 1) changing international and domestic norms regarding women’s rights, 2) donor resources, 3) international pressures on domestic governments and rebels in negotiating peace agreements with woman friendly language; 4) as well as media initiatives; 5) networking with women’s organizations and NGOs in the region and abroad to share information. The successes also depended on 6) changing institutional arrangements that included elections and 7) new executive leadership with the political will that would allow women to gain greater power. And finally they have 8) depended on the removal of warlords and militias as viable actors on the political scene.

The openness of the new regimes to women’s rights was generally influenced by 1) pressure from the women’s movements, state femocrats, and interest groups to demand changes in women’s rights; 2) donor pressures to adopt women’s rights reforms; 3) legislative capacity and independence from the executive; 4) the ways in which the interest groups or policy coalitions engage the executive and legislature through what Nazeen and Mahmud (2012) refer to as “political settlements”; 5) the capacity of legislatures to develop and control politics independently of the executive; 6) mechanisms to come to a consensus; and 5) judicial independence.

Initial political liberalization was important in creating the necessary political space for women to press for changes and in determining how the legislation was implemented, but the political system did not initially determine whether or not policies were passed. Since most postconflict contexts are hybrid (neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic), this opening helps explain the initial impetus for change but the lack of sustained movement towards democratization also may explain many of the constraints in maintaining the momentum for change in countries like Uganda.
A. Political Representation of Women in Postconflict Countries

Most cross-national studies of women’s legislative representation to date have been static and cross-sectional. A longitudinal statistical study using a relatively new technique of Latent Growth Curve modeling examining all independent countries in Africa at five year intervals from 1980 to 2008 found that abrupt changes, in particular, the end of longstanding conflict, which is related to the adoption of gender quotas, may have large impacts on women’s political representation, while at the same time, incremental changes in civil rights may also fuel long-term growth in women’s legislative numbers (Tripp and Hughes 2010). Left parties also have impact although their importance has diminished over time. Other factors, like the presence of a proportional representation system and economic growth that are generally correlated with women’s representation, are of less importance in Africa. Melanie Hughes (2009) conducted a study along global lines, which produced similar findings. The table below shows that the patterns extend beyond Africa.

Table 4. Rates of Female Representation in Postconflict Legislatures (after 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Region</th>
<th>Postconflict % Female Legislative Representation</th>
<th>No conflict % Female Legislative Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union
Women have also been running in presidential elections in increasing numbers especially in post-conflict countries, e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Liberia (2005), Rwanda (2003), and Sierra Leone (2002). It is no accident that a postconflict country was the first in Africa to have a woman president. In Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first elected woman president in Africa in 2005. Liberia already had a woman interim head of state in 1996, when Ruth Perry led the National State Council of Liberia that governed the country after the ouster of President Samuel Doe. Moreover, in the 2005 elections, two women ran for the presidency in Liberia and one for vice president. Although Liberia is still debating the introduction of quotas, women are represented at other levels. One third of cabinet ministers are women.

While some of the most dramatic changes have been at the national level, changes have also taken place in local government. In Liberia, one third of all superintendents are women and upcoming plans to hold elections for local government positions, including chiefs, will no doubt allow for even more women to gain access to these historically patriarchal structures.

In the first post war elections in 2004 in Sierra Leone, women won only 10% of the local level seats. After the elections, a system of Ward Development Committees (WDC) was established and considerable public awareness was raised by international and national NGOs regarding their purpose. These organizations carried out leadership training workshops for women. The Local Government Act of 2004 stipulated that a minimum of 50 percent representation of women on Ward Committees (Abduallah and Fofana-Ibrahim 2010). In spite of aggressive intimidation of female candidates, the number of elected women in the WDCs nearly doubled to 86, (19%). Civil society groups are now advocating that elections be held for Paramount Chiefs, who are almost all men, to bring the country into compliance with the constitution (Kellow 2010). Nevertheless, In Sierra Leone according to Castillejo (2008), women politicians reported that they often had to take out large loans to pay to be selected by the political party and then to bribe customary leaders and to gift their constituents.

Local level representation is less of an issue in South Asia, where women are more likely to be represented at the local level than at the national level, with women holding 50% of local level seats in India, 25% in Bangladesh, 33% in Pakistan, and 20% in Nepal. Some studies, however, have found that decentralization, rather than engendering equality at the local level, may in fact reinforce local power structures that discriminate against women (O’Connell 2012). Others, like Josephine Ahikire writing on Uganda, have explored the cultural constraints women face as political actors at the local level (Ahikire 2007). More research needs to be done to better understand local gender dynamics relating to decentralization.

Although quotas are the main reason for the changes in female representation in postconflict countries, there may be other explanations that come into play. Post-conflict countries tend to increase women’s representation because women are often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as outsiders to politics and therefore untainted by corruption, patronage and the factors that may have led to conflict. This often gives them greater credibility in the newly reconstituted political order.

B. Constitutional Changes
The most radical gender-related constitutional changes have been in postconflict countries. Most notably in these constitutional reforms, there has been the increasing introduction of clauses that allow the constitutional guarantees of equality to prevail in the event that there is a clash between women’s rights and customary laws and practices that violate women’s rights, discriminate against women, or infringe on bill of rights provisions regarding gender equality. Fourteen out of 16 post-conflict countries have such constitutional clauses whereas only 11 out of 32 non-post-conflict countries have such a provision. In Article 33 of the 1995 Ugandan constitution, for example, it states that “Laws, cultures, customs and traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or any other marginalised group . . . or which undermine their status, are prohibited by this Constitution.”

These are extremely profound challenges. They are, in principle, attempts to legitimize new law-based sources of authority for rights governing relations between men and women, family relations, and relationships between women and traditional, clan, and religious leaders. In the past, even when laws existed to regulate marriage, inheritance, custody, and other such practices, customary laws and practices co-existed and generally took precedence when it came to family and clan concerns. Even though in practice these customary norms may still prevail today, women’s organizations and lawmakers are now challenging them through constitutional and legislative changes in ways that we have not seen in the past.

Similarly, all but one of the post-conflict countries have provisions barring discrimination based on sex, whereas only two thirds of non-post-conflict countries have this provision in Africa. All six of the countries mentioning that that a child’s citizenship can follow the mother are post-conflict countries. Thus, some of the most explicit wording regarding women’s rights can be found in non-post conflict constitutions. The conjuncture of all these developments laid the basis for many legislation changes that followed. While many of these developments were largely symbolic, they represented a shift in norms and what was considered acceptable. They provided those who were able to contest the status quo the means to do so.

C. Legislative Reform

New land laws were enacted in Uganda, Tanzania (and Zanzibar separately), Mozambique, Zambia, Eritrea, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Africa after the 1990s incorporating women’s rights concerns. All but two of these — Tanzania and Zambia — are postconflict countries. Women were active and in leadership of a variety of land alliances and coalitions – from Uganda, to Rwanda, Mozambique, and Namibia – which have fought for the land rights of women, pastoralists, the landless and other marginalized people. The disruptions in property have been more extreme in postconflict countries, making it more urgent to address women’s need to control their means of livelihood and support for the household. Land is of critical importance to women because they depend on it for cultivation and therefore their livelihoods. Unequal access to land is one of the most important forms of economic inequality between men and women and has consequences for women as social and political actors. The problems are particularly acute in patrilineal households where women need to access inheritance and ownership through males.

Postconflict countries have twice the rates of legislation around violence than countries that have not experienced conflict in Africa. Much of the changing in thinking regarding GBV came out of experiences within conflict that heightened awareness of the severity of the problem. For example, one of the most important rulings that helped shatter prevailing norms about gender violence, not only in Africa, but globally, was the judgment against former mayor Jean-Paul
Akayesu delivered by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1998. For the first time in history, rape and sexual violence was explicitly recognized as an act of genocide and a crime against humanity.” It was the first ruling to regard a broad definition of rape involving a sexual physical invasion beyond merely a narrow description of penile penetration of the vagina and to regard rape as a form of torture (Copelon 2000, 227). This ruling has made it possible for countries like Burundi to introduce laws like the 2003 Law (No 1/004/2003) which penalizes the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence. The ICTR Akayesu ruling helped irreversibly change the way people thought about GBV during conflict (Copelon 2000). It was part of a long series of legal efforts to shift the normative ground regarding women and their rights to bodily integrity both during but also after civil conflict.

Some of the changes evident in postconflict African countries with respect to GBV:

- To date, 28 African countries have passed legislation around domestic violence.
- Eleven out of 13 post conflict countries have adopted such legislation, while one half of the non-post conflict countries have such legislation.
- Half of post conflict countries have legislation prohibiting marital rape, while less than one-fifth of countries that have not experienced major conflict have such legislation.
- All countries in Africa have anti-rape legislation, although in some countries it is fairly nonspecific. Virtually all post-conflict countries have adopted new legislation specifically addressing sexual violence since 2000 (in contrast to 5 out of 35 non-post conflict countries that did so).
- At least 27 countries have set an age of consent to sexual relations, generally between the ages of 14 and 16, below which sex is regarded as rape. The rape of children and teenagers is of grave concern in most countries, especially post-conflict countries, where the breakdown in societal norms has been extensive.
- At least 70% of post-conflict countries had adopted anti-trafficking legislation, while only half of non-post conflict countries have done so.
- Similarly, 70% of post conflict countries have passed such legislation addressing sexual harassment while only 40% of non-post conflict countries have done so.
- In recent years, half post conflict countries adopted spousal rape legislation. Less than one fifth of non-post conflict countries did so (Tripp 2009).

**Gender Renovation of Liberian Supreme Court: Pre and post conflict**
D. Security Sector Reform

A main theme of gender mainstreaming in postconflict countries has been the inclusion of women in security sector reform (SSR) processes. In post-conflict situations, this entails increasing the number of women employed in mainstream military structures such as the police and army, and ensuring that women are taken into account in demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration processes (DDR). The literature looks at the extent to which women are incorporated as gender experts and are represented on reform committees and the extent to which the military is provided with gender training. Much of the literature on SSR has looked at the extent to which these reforms simply reproduce rather than challenge existing structures, which are deemed patriarchal and hierarchical. Combat is central to notions of security and militarized masculinity remains unquestioned (Clarke 2008). One major gap in the SSR literature, however, has to do with the extent to which women have been brought into peacekeeping operations and reconstituted armies and police forces.

E. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

There has been considerable interest in the situation of women fighters, particularly after conflict. McKay and Mazurana (2004) carried out a study between 1990-2003 and found that women and girls were involved in fighting in 55 countries and were involved in armed conflict in 38 of these countries. They were also involved in international conflicts in Lebanon, Macedonia, Sudan and Uganda. Females generally comprise about one tenth to one third of the combatants. They made up one third in Sri Lanka (Lindsey 2000, Manoharan 2003), one quarter in El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), one third in the Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (Karame 1999); and 25% in Sierra Leone (Cohen 2010). In a 2008 Afrobarometer Survey of Liberia, of those who reported they had been fighters, 21% were women (Tripp 2012).

The DDR literature is mostly situated within the grey literature and has focused almost entirely on African cases, particularly Sierra Leone and to a lesser extent Liberia. One of the biggest problems with DDR is that the programs target only women with weapons when they target women at all. There is a need to target all women in armies, with or without weapons. Consequently many women never enter such programs. DDR programs would need to redefine female combatants to include women who are part of armies in any capacity, including support roles and providing sexual services. They should anticipate different needs among women ex-combatants. This means that assistance should not only come through DDR programs, but also through other programs and the functions of security should be separated from reintegration and rehabilitation (Bouta et al. 2005). While many women were not armed, in some conflicts the majority were as in Sierra Leone, according to MacKenzie, who found that 75% of her female interviewees who had been engaged with armies were involved in combat as well (2009).

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F. Long-term Impacts

While the literature has identified some of these short and medium-term impacts, particularly in the area of women’s political representation, even here much less is known about what impact women representatives are having in the political realm. There is a large gap in understanding the real world impacts of increased female representation and legislative and other reforms on women’s lives and on gender inequality. Ashild Fasch (2010), for example, notes that in Nepal, the large number of women in the constituent assembly has been an important first step, but they experience limited space to express themselves in Nepali politics because of the pervasive male domination of political parties as well as low levels of education. We know relatively little about the local level and the impacts of decentralization in virtually all contexts.

We need to know much more about the impacts of women parliamentarians. Similarly, we need to know more about the actual gender gaps in education, health, access to social services, access to justice, and many other arenas. While there are individual country studies that touch on aspects of these issues, we need to know more about some of the following concerns:

Women’s positions changed during times of conflict and in many postconflict countries, women became economically more active out of necessity as older divisions of labor were transformed (Bouta et al. 2005). How can these transformations be capitalized upon?

What particular constraints do various groups of women like widows, refugees, IDPs, female heads of households and teenage mothers face in the postconflict economy? What policy changes have made the most difference to their lives? The number of female headed households increases during conflict. In Rwanda 37 percent of the households are female headed. In post-conflict Timor Leste, about 45% of adult women were widowed (UNIFEM 2004). What particular challenges do they face?

Since women make up the majority of the displaced, what impact does displacement have on women’s ability to reestablish themselves economically and politically? There is a very small literature on displacement of women as refugees and IDPs and most of the postconflict literature has focused on a limited number of concerns, e.g., health and GBV.

Women’s exclusions from postconflict reconstruction efforts makes it difficult for them to secure land and other resources to support their households. People who return to their home areas after conflict often find their land has been appropriated. How does this affect women in particular? Legal barriers exist, but even when women have legal entitlements to ownership, they continue to face difficulties in accessing land, primarily for cultural and political reasons (Lastarria 2005). Many of the IDPs who remained behind in the IDP camps in northern Uganda were widows because they had difficulties claiming and reclaiming land.

What do these gender transformations do to men and male identity? Are men’s challenges in providing for their households linked to domestic violence, substance abuse, and other challenging social consequences? Have donors contributed to the sidelining of men by supporting only women as was the case in some poverty alleviation programs in Sri Lanka (Kottegoda 2008).
Conflicts tend to expand informal economies as the formal economy collapses. Women tend to be heavily represented in the informal economy (Zuckerman and Greenberg 2004). How does this affect their ability to gain jobs in the formal sector in a postconflict setting? What particular constraints do women face in accessing microcredit after conflict?

VII. EVALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE BASE

A. Strength of Knowledge Base

The biggest problem is the quality of research, which needs to be improved significantly. There is very little basic research in this area, either qualitative or quantitative. The work is very descriptive and much of it draws simply on secondary sources. Very little scholarship is motivated by puzzles or theoretical questions. This means that the research is often not rigorous in its design, more so than in many other areas of gender studies. This probably has to do with the difficulty of doing research in postconflict and fragile countries. There are still people writing studies in which they interview only women and not men. There are still studies in which data is not disaggregated by gender, e.g., battle deaths, although there is some evidence that ethnic wars are more deadly than others for women (Plümper and Neumeyer 2006).

The empirical weakness of research in this area has spawned almost an industry of research attempting to refute various claims, particularly ones that have emerged from feminist INGOs involved in advancing women’s rights. Joshua Goldstein (2011) in his book Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide takes on two of these myths: “Civilians Were 10 Percent of War Deaths but are Now 90 Percent” with the corollary that most of them are women and children and “An epidemic of sexual violence is raging unabated in Congo.”

There are a plethora of other such claims that have yet to be refuted. For example, one popular and often repeated claim in the literature is that women in Rwanda gained power because there was a change in the gender ratio (see for example work of Powley [2008], O’Connell [2011], Zuckerman and Greenberg [2004]). There was indeed a very large two percent change in the gender ratio, but it is not enough to drive a jump from 18% of women in parliament to 56%. Much more needs to be explained than just a drop in the number of men, however substantial it was.

In recent years, New York Times journalist Nicolas Kristof, UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, Amnesty International), International Rescue Committee, McKay (2009), Bannerman (2008) and others have cited a statistic that 60 to 70% of women in Liberia experienced sexual violence and some have even produced a figure of 92%.

The most frequently cited statistic about the prevalence of sexual violence in the Liberian conflict was that 75% of women were raped (e.g., Kristof 2009a; UNFPA, 2006). Rape rates are often inflated not just by consultants, but also by women themselves who seek to attract attention to their cause (see Medie 2012). Evidence from two peer-reviewed, survey-based studies regarding sexual violence during the Liberian civil war (Swiss et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2008), as well as the Demographic and Health Survey (2007) produced much more modest results: the Swiss Survey found the rate to be closer to 15% and the DHS survey found that 18% of women had experienced sexual violence at some time in their life. The majority named a partner as the perpetrator and only 8% of those reporting sexual violence were victims of
perpetrators who were ‘soldiers’ or ‘police’ (Cohen and Green 2012).

This literature is especially prone to overgeneralization and a tendency to over-romanticize women’s roles, partly because the literature has been generated to address donor concerns and to advocate for a role for women in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Much of the grey literature, in particular, is carried out by consultants for donors to serve short-term programming needs or for conference papers funded by donors and INGOs working in this area. There are pockets of research carried out in particular countries and contexts that are quite detailed and empirically strong, but the overall picture is uneven. The need for quality basic research cannot be stressed enough.

Perhaps because of these evidence gaps, there are numerous unsubstantiated claims that are repeated in the literature, which may or may not be true, but would require empirical investigation. Greater effort needs to be taken to avoid such exaggerated claims and to provide solid evidence for claims that are made. Such exaggerations are dangerous because they undermine the credibility of all scholarship in this area and they impair the development of good policy and advocacy strategies.

Some topics may have gained too much international attention, affecting the ability of researchers to conduct studies. Local populations may find they are inundated by researchers asking the same questions. The problem of rape in Bosnia elicited hundreds of programs and initiatives to the point that one woman said: “I am sick of the media and everyone coming here and asking us to talk about our experience of rape.” (Quoted in Bouta et al. 2005, 25). Similar comments have been reported in eastern Congo. This constrains the ability of researchers to carry out their work. Researchers need to be sensitive to such dynamics as they face particular challenges to convey the objectives of their research in such contexts and find creative ways to be unobtrusive.

Bouta et al. argued in 2005 that too much of the research was focused on reductionist perspectives on women’s roles. This is still the case although there is much more work that does conflict analysis from a gendered perspective. There is still a need for more analytical work with policy implications.

Scholars of international relations do not generally do fieldwork, yet they dominate this field for reasons that have to do with the way in which conflict studies have evolved within the subfield of international relations. Those working in the field of law and some women’s studies scholars also do not always carry out fieldwork. Quite a large number of authors did not know the languages spoken in the countries they were researching and had to work through translators. A large number of the scholars worked in this field did not have area studies background in the region they were working. While it is not always possible to have a strong background in multiple countries if one is doing comparative work, the level of unpreparedness was surprisingly high in this literature. Very few studies revealed a depth of understanding of context and few provided adequate contextualization of issues. All of these factors have contributed to some of the weaknesses identified in this study.

The lack of this kind of background is evident in some of the crossnational work that is carried out, with strange hypotheses and weakly argued cases. One crossnational study, for example, found that women’s prospects for success in peacebuilding is dependent on the status of
women, as measured by their life expectancy. The study drew on the case of Sierra Leone to argue that because women fared better in this country, the prospects for UN peacekeeping operations were better than in other places. The author argued that in such societies women have more opportunities to express themselves in peace processes. The author said that she expected that UN efforts should be met with systematically less hostility and more cooperation in areas where women had higher life expectancy and hence a relatively higher social status and higher levels of political activity. By this logic one has to wonder why women were not politically mobilized prior to the war even though they had a life expectancy of 59 in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The logic also does not explain why in Tanzania, women have a 55-year life expectancy and have been mobilized politically for a much longer time. The study would need to use many more measures of women’s advancement and consider alternative factors explaining peacebuilding success to convincingly draw the conclusions it does.

Most of the work on statebuilding and peacebuilding and gender is carried out in the global north. This is a problem because northerners are all too frequently handicapped by a lack of in depth knowledge of the societies they are working on, a lack of language skills, and they cannot always ask the relevant questions that need to be asked.

**B. Production of Knowledge Base**

Given that much of the work has been produced in the grey literature — often for International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) and donors, much of it simply citing the work of others — suggests that there have not been serious investments in long term basic research, which is expensive and time consuming. The difficulty of

**Presses:** A wide variety of presses — 31 in all — published on gender and peacebuilding between 2005 and 2012. However the presses publishing the most included the Routledge, Palgrave MacMillan, and the Dalai Lama’s Foundation for Universal Responsibility. Routledge and Palgrave MacMillan are generally ranked as second tier presses and their output is fairly uneven in quality. The top tier presses publishing in this area: Oxford University Press (OUP), Cornell University Press, and University of Chicago Press. Other second tier presses publishing in this area included Lynne Rienner, NYU Press, Rowman & Littlefield, SAGE and US Institute of Peace (Goodson et al. 1999).

OUP published one book related to women and peacebuilding in this time period. By comparison, a smaller but better developed subfield of “women and political representation” had 10 books published in this same time period by OUP, and two on gender quotas alone.

The 11 books in this field that are most heavily cited in Google Scholar — which allowed greatest consistency of comparison — were published by the top tier presses. They mostly highlighted general themes rather than specific countries (with 2 exceptions out of the top 11 books). There was no concentration of themes. They covered everything from violence, to peacebuilding, nationbuilding, transitional justice, female fighters, civil society, and peacekeeping.

**Journals:** A surprisingly wide variety of journals also published in this area from 2005-12: 62 in all. They primarily fall into the following categories of journals: area studies (mainly Africa), development studies, feminist/women’s studies, humanitarian studies (refugees, Red Cross), legal studies, international relations and peace and security studies. There are a few assorted
social science journals that publish this work. The majority of journals publishing in this area are interdisciplinary. Very little is published in mainstream disciplinary journals. The journals with the most coverage in this field included Feminist Africa (10 articles); International Journal of Transitional Justice (9); International Peacekeeping (4); Journal of Peace Research (4); International Feminist Journal of Politics (4); Politics & Gender (3); Women's Studies International Forum (3); Feminist Legal Studies (3) and African Affairs (3).

Of the journals publishing in this area, the top ranked journals for their areas included: African Affairs and Journal of Modern African Studies in African Studies; Journal of Conflict Resolution and Journal of Peace Research in international relations; and Politics & Gender in gender studies. This ranking was determined by impact factor based on Journal Citation Reports in the Web of Knowledge.

**Grey Literature:** With respect to the grey literature, the institutes that publish the most include: Institute for Inclusive Security (IIS) in Cambridge, US, (17 publications), Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, Switzerland, (10), Human Rights Watch (HRW) (9), US Institute for Peace in Washington, D.C., (7); International alert (4) Isis - Women's International Cross Cultural Exchange based in Manila, Philippines, and Kampala, Uganda (6), and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in Berlin, Germany (4). About half of the papers in the report dataset are not cited at all, which does not mean they are not being read, but their impact is minimal. Many of these publications are quite descriptive and in the case of HRW and IIS, they may be quite brief. The quality is noticeably uneven. Some of these groups have a clear political agenda to promote women’s participation, women’s rights or human rights. Sometimes this results in publications that are not rigorous from a scholarly point of view, even if their intentions are commendable.

The top 20 most cited publications within the grey literature came from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2 articles), Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa; Center for Women Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., United Nations University –World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki; World Bank, Washington, D.C. (2 articles), UNIFEM (now UN Women), New York; Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael based in the Hague (2 articles); U.S. Institute of Peace based in Washington, D.C.; Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF); Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid; International Crisis Group (2 articles) Brussels, and New York; Peace Research Institute Oslo, and International Alert (London). While the geographic range of sources of widely cited scholarship is broad in terms of the global north, it is less impressive in terms of the global South and the countries most affected by conflict. Only ISIS-WICCE from Uganda appears in this list as a postconflict country. No doubt, the language restriction of the search limits what is being cited in French, Portuguese, Arabic and other languages. However, the Google citation scholar search does capture a lot of what is being published and read globally today.

**Overall Patterns:** One way of evaluating the quality of a publication and its impact on a field is the number of citations. Other methods include the rankings of the press and journal. All of these methods were used along with individual evaluation of the articles, books and reports.

In comparing the grey literature with the articles in terms of citations, 17% of the articles were not cited but most were published since 2011 so one would not expect much citation. Of the reports, 58% were not cited. On average, reports were cited 2.5 times and articles were cited 9
times. Of the articles that were cited, they were cited on average 11 times while the reports were cited 6 times on average. Of the reports, those institutes producing the most in terms of quantity are not necessarily being cited the most. Only the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and USIP in the aforementioned group producing the most had reports that were widely cited. These patterns of citation between the grey and academic literature are probably not that different in other fields, although given the weakness of the academic literature in this field, the problem is perhaps worse than what it appears.

Of the most cited authors of the academic literature, the majority are based at research universities in postindustrial countries around the world and are full professors: Elisabeth Wood (Political Science, Yale University); Hilary Charlesworth (Director, Centre for International Governance and Justice, Professor & ARC Laureate Fellow, Australian National University); Christopher Blattman (Yale University and Columbia University); Christine Bell (Professor of Constitutional Law at University of Edinburgh); and Diane Otto (Director of the Institute for International Law and the Humanities) at Melbourne Law School.

The regional focus of much of the research on gender and peacebuilding and statebuilding since 2005 has been on Africa, which is understandable since the majority of conflicts numerically have been based on the continent. This is followed by South Asia and then Southeast Asia. The countries in my search that have most coverage include Rwanda, Liberia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The countries with less coverage include DR Congo, northern Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Cambodia, Angola and Aceh. Language issues no doubt have something to do with some of these trends. The relatively high levels of coverage for Nepal and Sri Lanka can be attributed to the higher levels of authorship of reports from South Asia. Portuguese and French speaking countries like Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Cambodia reflect the literature in English. The high numbers on Rwanda, which is French speaking, can be attributed to several authors who focused on this topic at the Institute for Inclusive Security and produced a series of articles and brief papers. The imbalance, nevertheless speaks to the need for more balanced coverage.

The main disciplines represented in the database are law and political science. But in general a good mix of disciplines is represented.

**D. Difficulties of Conducting Research**

Some conflict and postconflict contexts are especially dangerous and challenging, making researchers, even local researchers, reluctant to go there. Such locations may be logistically challenging in terms of housing, transportation, internet access, and finding research assistants. Security is often an issue, and female researchers, who are most likely to work in this area, sometimes face particular constraints. Martha Huggins and her collaborators detail these challenges for women in a wonderful book entitled *Women Fielding Danger: Negotiating Ethnographic Identities in Field Research* (2009). In addition, remote areas may be expensive to work in. Dissertation advisers are also reluctant to advise their students to carry out research in such places. This affects the quality and amount of research being carried out in particular locations. This explains in part some of the gaps we see in research. Yet the need to know how people and women are experiencing conflict was and is no less great.
E. Research and Evidence Gaps

This overview shows that the main topics that have attracted interest in both the academic and policy/grey literature (in order of importance) have to do with 1) women’s involvement in a variety of activities related to peacemaking, 2) violence against women, particularly sexual violence, and 3) transitional justice. Within the scholarship on conflict resolution, there has been a heavy focus on UNSCR 1325 and other treaties. Also analysis of peacekeeping operations from a gender perspective has been of great interest. And while there is an understanding that women’s movements have had an impact on peaceful outcomes in conflicted countries, the mechanisms and causal pathways of these relationships have not been fully explored. The same is true for the role of donors: we know less about when and how they impact gender outcomes.

The gaps are also particularly glaring when it comes to statebuilding in postconflict and fragile state settings more generally but, in particular, with regard to long term gender outcomes with respect to 1) social services, 2) the economy; 3) property and land rights; 4) the rule of law; 5) constitutional reforms; 6) legislative reforms; 7) electoral processes, 8) political participation and representation; and 9) decentralization and local government. There are a handful of articles on service provision, workforce participation, and constitutional and legislative reform in select postconflict countries.

While we understand how some structural factors influence positive gender outcomes, it is not clear how economic well-being influences women’s rights in postconflict countries. Existing explanations link economic growth to democratization and attitudes of gender equality. However, these patterns do not explain some of the changes we are seeing in hybrid and authoritarian states that are adopting women’s rights policies and increasing female political representation. More research is needed to better understand how structural factors influence positive (and negative) gender outcomes.

There is relatively more attention paid to political participation and representation in the literature, but it has usually been situated within more general discussions of women’s political representation rather than with a focus on elements that pertain to postconflict concerns and fragility. There are a few country studies — some of which are book length— of women and politics in post-conflict politics, e.g., Sylvia Tamale (1999) and Aili Tripp (2000) on Uganda, Jennifer Leigh Disney (2008) on Nicaragua and Mozambique, Jennie Burnet on Rwanda (2012), Maria Stern on Guatemala. There are a few studies of the use of quotas in post-conflict countries and the ways in which women gain political representation, e.g., Bauer and Britton (2006); Tripp et al. (2009); Zuckerman and Greenberg (2004), Hughes (2009). And a handful of studies have looked at women legislators’ impact on legislation in post conflict countries, e.g., Pearson and Powley (2008), Luciak and Olmos (2005).

Thus, slightly more has been written about short term and medium term outcomes, particularly increases in female legislative representation, the adoption of legislation, and various policy changes, but much less on the outcomes for people’s lives, e.g., women’s access to health care, education, justice, or political influence. While there is an intrinsic justice in equal political representation that is important, equality of representation does not a priori determine that women representatives will necessarily advance a women’s rights agenda any more than the right to vote guaranteed that women would vote in particular ways. However, literature in advanced industrialized countries and in Latin America has suggested that women in legislatures
tend to promote more woman friendly legislation. A crossnational study found that women in parliament had a statistically significant effect on gender equality in family law, although their case studies suggested that women in parliament might be more important in preventing rollbacks rather than in initiating reforms in this area (Htun and Weldon 2012). Regardless of these findings, the effect of women parliamentarians has not been systematically demonstrated in postconflict, non-democratic, and fragile countries.

Similarly, legislative and policy changes in women’s rights can have important symbolic impacts, while the extent to which they actually change practice substantively has yet to be empirically determined, particularly in places where the political will and state capacity is lacking and where opposition has been mobilized against reforms. We also need more in depth and comparative work looking at such legislative and policy outcomes.

What follows is a discussion of gaps within various literatures.

Framing Security

Scholars should ask which frames are most useful in shaping policy interventions (e.g., human security, human rights, human development, gender mainstreaming)? While the critiques against essentialized notions of women and men appear to have been exhausted, there

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4 One of the most common popular frames regarding gender and conflict/peace especially popular in some of the non-academic research has to do with women’s natural affinity to peacemaking and their reluctance to endorse violence to resolve conflicts. This is said to be related to women’s inclination to support collective or consensual approaches to solving problems. Some feminists have argued that women’s socialization makes them less competitive than men, less interested in power struggles, more egalitarian and more collaborative in problem solving. Others have challenged such assumptions, showing that the attitudinal differences between women and men regarding conflict are minimal except for those women who identify with the women’s movement or with feminism (Cook & Wilcox 1991; Conover 1988; Conover & Sapiro 1993), or who are supportive of gender equality (Tessler & Warriner 1997; Caprioli & Boyer 2001). Essentialized assumptions about women’s natural inclinations continue to be critiqued in the literature because they appear so commonly in UN peacekeeping manuals and in the policy literature more generally. Numerous recent studies, for example, have examined the content of UN peacekeeping operation documentation in different parts of the world and have found them to be replete with essentialized representations of women (Puechguirbal. 2010, Valenius 2007), including the focus on women as mothers, as helpless victims, vulnerable people in need of protection, as associated with children in the motherandchildren frame, as civilians (to the exclusion of their role as fighters). Men are also reified as fighters, as leaders, politicians and as peacemakers and have often not been talked about as civilians in the same way as women fall into that category. For this reason, Ruth Jacobson and others challenge the peacemaking idealizations of women, suggesting that some women take action to reduce violence, while others sought to reproduce divisions rather than challenge them. The majority of women, according to Ruth Jacobson, have been neither peacemakers nor involved in paramilitaries. Women have engaged in a broad spectrum of activities, but, like men, have been limited by gendered conditions and constraints.

Perhaps the most common trope in popular discourse relies on connections between women’s peacemaking and their essentialized roles as mothers. Some see motherhood or women’s potential for motherhood as a basis for women’s engagement in peace activism (Naples 1998; Rupp 1997). For a few, the gender gap regarding the use of force in international conflicts is based on gendered physiological differences, which for women is based on their natural reproductive ability (Daly 1984). Some have argued that women use motherhood strategically, to give their movements greater leverage and credibility and to broaden their base of support (Swerdlow 1993; Taylor 1997). There is often a stereotypical belief in society that women are less threatening than men, thus allowing women greater room to maneuver in public spheres during conflict, and emboldening them to transform their private suffering into public protest (Sharoni 2001, 92-93; Giacaman & Johnson 1989, 162). Some scholars have observed that wars break down the public and private spheres as homes become locations of raids by soldiers and sites of destruction, thus pushing women into public action (Aretxaga 1997, 54, 69).
remains a conundrum that has not been adequately tackled in the literature. Some of these tropes, particularly the motherhood one, are extremely popular in the countries surveyed for this report. They often formed the basis for women’s own mobilization from Sudan to Nepal (e.g., de Mel 2005). In Sri Lanka, for example, much of the mobilization was around motherhood politics. It included organizations like Mothers and Daughters of Lanka, the Mother’s Front, Jaffna Mothers Front. The Association of War Affected Women was led by a woman who wanted to focus on the needs of widows of soldiers. She brought together mothers of the missing and crossed the Hindu/Buddhist/Christian divide. Many groups like this one worked to build bridges across ethnic and religious lines (Manchanda 2005).

Only a handful of authors seem to be willing to deal with this reality and most who engage with these themes are from these regions themselves and do so uncritically. The only exception to this would be some of the earlier literature on the Argentine Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo, which took maternal politics seriously.

Another gap in the literature has to do with the extent to which women’s mobilization has been shaped by religious influences. Religion played complex and multiple roles shaping conflict and resistance to it on the part of women. In Timor Leste women, were actively involved in peaceful nonviolent protest and activism inspired by their Catholic roots (Mason 2005). The marginalization of lower Hindu castes has had a profound influence on the conflict in Nepal (Geiser 2005), while Buddhist influences played a role in Sri Lanka. In Liberia, women mobilized across contentious religious lines in demanding peace. Religion has featured in only a few studies in the literature surveyed (e.g., Skidmore and Lawrence 2007) and in ways that minimize its role relative to its influence and importance. Women’s involvement in the spread of Pentecostalism and independent churches in West Africa, particularly in conflict ridden parts, for example, deserves greater investigation, as does the spread of Boko Haram and other Muslim fundamentalist groups.

Finally, there could be more attention given to comparing various security frames and how effective they have been in addressing gender concerns. While feminists have gone far in critiquing realist and other existing frames, less has been done to discuss and compare frames that emerge from or intersect with women’s rights concerns, e.g., human security, mother politics, just peace, moral and religious frames, and gendered war and peace.

Peace Negotiations

There are virtually no studies of attempts by women to engage and influence peace negotiations except for a few first hand accounts and news reports. Yet women were actively trying to influence talks from Somalia to DRC, Liberia, Uganda, and Burundi. All the basic questions still

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Variants of the maternal peace argument have come under criticism by those who find that it is not supported empirically. Others have criticized the conflation of women and motherhood with the idea that women are by nature peaceful. They point out the many ways in which motherhood has been used to serve racist practices and sinister forms of nationalism, for example, in Nazi Germany (Cockburn, 2004, 38; Koontz 1997). Some women have been willing accomplices in nationalist or ethnic propaganda campaigns idealizing women and mothers of a particular group in ways that may serve to foment conflict (Waller & Rycenga 2000). Yet another line of argumentation draws on the experience of Women in Black in Kosovo in the 1990s where women’s groups pressured their governments for effective international peacekeeping. Because women had not been subjected to male socialization and narrow constructions of masculinity, they were freer to pursue non-violent strategies in this context (Cockburn 2004, 38).
need to be answered: Did UNSCR 1325 affect peace negotiations in any way? Why or why not? How have women been involved with international NGOs that carry out behind the scenes diplomacy? For those women who were involved in official peace talks, did they work with women’s organizations and what interests did they see themselves representing? What difference did they make? What impact did women have on negotiations and which strategies worked best? What women’s rights language has been used in peace agreements and to what end? Why was women’s rights language left out, e.g., oversight, lack of expertise, commitment or because it would make the overall agreement more difficult (see Bell and O’Rourke 2011)? How and why did women who participated in the talks mobilize across party, ethnic, and religious differences (which happened to a greater degree than with men in most cases)?

**Women’s Informal Peacemaking Initiatives**

There is a need for more analysis of the role of women in peace movements and in informal peacemaking activities. This literature on women’s role in informal peacemaking and in peace movements is very anecdotal and descriptive. There has been almost no analysis that is comparative and theoretical. How important were these movements relative to other factors in bringing about an end to conflict? Which strategies worked best under which conditions? What conditions gave rise to these strategies? How were they used to influence formal participation by women?

The literature on women and conflict has shifted the discussion away from women simply as passive victims of conflict to treating them as agents (Enloe 2000; Jacobs, Jacobson et al. 2000; Jetter, Orleck et al. 1997; Kumar 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Waller and Rycenga 2000). Curiously, much of the emphasis on agency has focused on women as fighters.⁵ New work shows how the type of war determines the extent to which women fight (Lahai 2010) and that women are more likely to fight in resource driven than ethno-religious or secessionist wars. There is also growing interest in women as perpetrators of violence (e.g., Laura Sjoberg). Surprisingly, the quality and quantity of the work on women as fighters has far outstripped that of women engaged in peacemaking.

Within countries, there are almost no histories of these movements and initiatives. There needs to be more analysis of these movements as social movements. There are no in depth accounts of how these movements engaged formal processes or were limited by them. How did they work with other movements, parties, interest groups, elites, the military, warlords, religious leaders, peacekeeping troops, and other social and state actors? How were political settlements or accommodations formed between women’s rights advocates and the state and how were these settlements balanced against the interests of opponents of such reforms? What factors and forces facilitated or impeded their efforts? How did they engage international actors? What were the constraints they faced? Much of the literature emphasizes the positive aspects of women’s mobilization, yet war makes people act in ways they would never dream of doing under normal circumstances in order to stay alive. Even peace activists — more often than is often acknowledged — cut unholy deals and collaborated with “the enemy” in order to survive. Opportunism, careerism, nepotism, corruption, and deceit are rampant during conflict and peacemakers are not immune to these tendencies. Agency is often described as a positive in the literature, but the realities of conflict may make agency a more ambiguous concept. During the Liberian women’s peace movement, one set of peace activists associated with President Charles Taylor allegedly

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⁵ See, for example, work by Chris Coulter, Rachel Brett, Irma Specht, Dyan Mazurana, Christopher Carlson, Jeannie Annan, Christopher Blattman, Megan MacKenzie, Myriam Denov, Richard Maclure, Susan McKay, Carol Thompson, Beth Verhey, Marie Vlachova, Christine Gervais.
tried to ambush and kill the leaders of the movement during one effort to engage and disarm soldiers. These kinds of realities need to be incorporated in understanding the constraints peace movements face. Insider accounts are often very useful and serve their own political purposes, but they often do not engage in the kind of hardnosed objective analysis required in scholarship.

Bouta et al. (2005) argue that roles change in conflict but not gender relations. This seems to be a matter of debate and would be worth interrogating further. Can roles change without affecting gender relations? Do gender relations change in particular contexts and not others? What would changes in gender relations look like and how would one identify such a change?

There is also a need to look at what happens after the conflict and after the focus on peace activism is over. During the wars, south Sudanese women were involved in grassroots mobilization and peace building activities. After the signing of the 2005 CPA, the majority of leading women took posts within the government and within SPLM structures. This meant that the women’s movement was bereft of its leadership (Ali 2011). The same happened in Liberia after the 2003 Accra Accords were signed. Most of the leaders of the peace movement took better paid positions with international NGOs or in government. In Angola, the peace movement similarly died down after the war as international funders pulled out. While one cannot expect a peace movement to continue after the conflict has subsided, the dilution of civil society and strengthening of the state has important implications for democracy building. It drains organizations of leaders and resources that can challenge the state, advocate for women’s rights, play a watchdog role, and ensure state accountability.

UNSCR 1325

While there has been some scholarship looking at the language of the UN resolutions, there also needs to be more attention placed on the planning, designing and implementation of various programs such as DDR and security sector reform. Comparative studies would be useful, highlighting what has worked and what has not. Additionally, in depth country studies are needed.

The Security Sector Reform literature is very weak. It examines the inclusion of women in military structures like the policy and army and the extent to which women are involved in DDR processes security reform processes according to Yaliwe Clarke (2008).

Transitional Justice

While the project of transitional justice is to hold perpetrators of violence accountable, women themselves often are more interested in creating a system that serves the needs of victims, which would require more than the promise of individual justice, but also addressing social, economic, and development-based rights (Cahn 2006; Pillay, Speare and Scully 2010). It seems that it is this latter concern that needs to be better articulated in the postwar contexts. What concretely does this mean in postwar contexts where resources are limited, capacity is weak and political commitment to improving the conditions for marginalized poor is uncertain? One can also ask as Susan Hirsch (2011): Does the project of transitional justice enhance women’s agency, particularly when it frames women as a particular category of victim in the situation of mass atrocity? Does it help or hurt women?
Donor Pressures

There should be more analysis of the frames which govern foreign assistance to and policy regarding women, particularly in postconflict situations. It should look at what impact various frames have had. A shorthand set of tropes depict women in the aid industry in their brochures, literature, and websites. These include, for example, the victim, survivor, saint, the mother provider, the group member, natural environmentalist, and peacemaker. They are based on simplistic assumptions suggesting that women, often because of innate qualities, are key to peace, environmental sustainability, ending corruption, development, and many other positive outcomes. While these are not new ideas and are reflective of the persistence of modernization frames, they have increasingly captured the popular imagination, influencing donors, development practitioners, policy makers, journalists, and even military strategists. Such assumptions matter in addressing donor priorities, they drive the financing of aid, and determine which policy strategies gain traction for women’s rights actors. The interest in gender policy has even made its way into unexpected corners, as the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and international security specialists ponder how to increase girls’ education in countries like Afghanistan. Women’s education is being described as an essential component in the fight against global terrorism in books like Greg Mortenson’s now tarnished work Three Cups of Tea (2007).

To what extent do donor funds set the gender agenda, interfere with it, and to what extent do they compliment women’s movement activities and goals? More research is needed in examining the frames of policy documents of international organizations regarding gender equality and the practice on the ground. These types questions have rarely been explored in a postconflict context, where donor aid generally has enormous influence because of state fragility and weakness.

A related concern has to do with how international norms spread. Little is known about how gender related norms are diffused regionally and internationally, even internally within countries.

Finally, given the intense interest in Kony generated by Invisible Children in the US and globally, albeit brief, the campaign raises complex questions about the ways in which international social movements, religious organizations, and media relate to conflicts in developing countries. The campaign was premised on militarism and simplistic understandings of the conflict in Uganda. It was devoid of Ugandan agency, not to mention gender perspectives. Yet it touched deeply into something in the psyche of Americans. There is need to better understand such transnational movements and the moral and ethical questions they raise about how concern for others in conflicts is generated. Looking at the gender dimensions would be an important aspect of this.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on this assessment, it will be important to address the many gaps identified above, particularly in the area of statebuilding. This study recommends that more attention be paid to long term gender outcomes with respect to 1) social services, 2) the economy; 3) property and land rights; 4) the rule of law; 5) constitutional reforms; 6) legislative reforms; 7) electoral processes, 8) political participation and representation; and 9) decentralization and local government.
It is equally important to address issues relating to the quality of the literature and encourage more work that is evidence based, rigorous in terms of methods, theory building, and addressing key questions and puzzles.

Some of the aforementioned problems in quality of research can be remedied, in part, by encouraging and supporting more scholars from the postconflict regions to do more research and write on their own societies.

At the same time, there is an equally urgent need for more comparative work in studies of peacebuilding, fragile states, and statebuilding. Comparisons need to be made both with non-postconflict countries, between postconflict countries, and between non-postconflict and postconflict countries. To date, most of the work is country specific. Yet there are many questions that one cannot answer theoretically without a comparative perspective. It is only by controlling for various features across cases that one can uncover key patterns. Country studies are good at explaining causal mechanisms and processes of change, but without the broader comparative theorizing studies of mechanisms and processes cannot be deployed.

We also need more historical work to understand the processes of change, particularly of institutional change. Once again, to answer many of the interesting puzzles, one needs the longitudinal perspective of time in order to see what is different. Too often, unsubstantiated assumptions are made about the past, suggesting little or great change. More careful work needs to be done to make credible comparisons with the past and to develop theories of change.

There is very little work on intersectionality and how gender interacts with other identities in postconflict settings. Women are more often than not treated as a monolithic entity, with little reference to the ways in which their various identities affect how they experience postconflict situations. The salience of various identities varies by society, historical point in time, and context and can include ethnicity, race, caste, religion, class, sexual preference, age, and many other such identities.

Researchers need to think about what the focus on statebuilding means in contexts like the DRC, where the state is predatory, the main source of human rights abuses, oppressive, and menacing. Does strengthening state institutions allow the state to predate even more efficiently or does it challenge those tendencies? Drawing on the human security framework and the feminist critiques that come from the international relations literature, a focus on statebuilding, puts the focus on the state, rather than on all the types of state and societal activities that would promote gender equality. The donor focus on statebuilding in postconflict contexts has often resulted in a diversion of resources away from civil society in the aftermath of conflict, depleting the capacity of the very forces that could help make statebuilding responsive to citizens, engage citizens in statebuilding initiatives, and play a watchdog role.

The aforementioned decline of conflict will have implications for the kind of research needed. According to the 2011 World Development Report of the World Bank, forms of violence are changing away from civil conflict and shifting towards criminal violence, terrorism and civil unrest. As types of conflicts change, so will forms of conflict resolution. The causes of conflicts will be different as well. In Africa, for example, conflicts will probably related more to land grabbing, climate change, and the phenomenon of newfound oil in countries like Uganda, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Conflicts may be more localized. They may also entail election
related violence, isolated incidents of terrorism, coup d’êts, low-grade violence, widespread sexual violence as we are witnessing in eastern Congo, and high levels of domestic violence. The phenomenon of statebuilding will become more important than it has been while peacebuilding, the way it has been conceived, will need to be redefined if the present trends continue.

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X. RESOURCES

NETWORKS

Femmes Africa Solidarité
http://www.fasngo.org/
Created in 1996, Femmes Africa Solidarité seeks to foster and promote the inclusion of women in conflict prevention in Africa, including conflict prevention, management and resolution. FAS works for the empowerment of women to foster leadership capabilities critical for equal participation in decision-making.

Global Justice Center
http://www.globaljusticecenter.net
The Global Justice Center seeks to enforce women's rights to equality in political representation and transitional justice processes. The Center trains leaders and policymakers in the affirmative use of women's rights to develop representative democracies.

Global Network of Women Peacebuilders
http://www.gnwp.org/members/amani-communities-africa
The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) bridges the gap between policy discussions and implementation and action on the ground on women, peace and security issues.

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Peace Portal
http://www.gppac.net
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a member-led network of civil society organizations (CSOs) active in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding across the world. The network is organized around 15 regional networks of local organizations, each region having its own priorities, character and agenda.

Human Rights Watch
http://www.hrw.org
The Women’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch fights against the dehumanization and marginalization of women. The organization is dedicated to protecting and defending human rights by publishing reports on human rights conditions around the world.

Institute for Inclusive Security
http://www.huntalternatives.org/pages/7_the_initiative_for_inclusive_security.cfm
A project of Hunt Alternative Fund, the Institute promotes the inclusion of women in peace processes through research, training and advocacy. The Institute includes The Women Waging Peace Network, a network of more than 1,000 women peacemakers around the world which allows these women to connect with each other.

International Civil Society Action Network
http://www.icanpeacework.org
Formed in 2006, the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), for Women’s Rights, Peace and Security, aims to strengthen civil society and women’s participation and influence in conflict prevention, social justice, coexistence, and peacebuilding efforts, in situations of political transition, closed political space, and conflict affected states.
Nobel Women’s Initiative
http://nobelwomensinitiative.org
Established in 2006 by Nobel Peace Laureates, the six founders, all of them women, have used the visibility of the Nobel prize to promote the work of women’s rights researchers, activists, and organizations that seek to target the root causes of violence. The Nobel Women’s Initiative strive to develop a peaceful world free from all forms of violence and committed to equality and justice.

PeaceWomen
http://peacewomen.org/pages/about-us
PeaceWomen is a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), based out of their United Nations Office in New York City. Its mission is described on its website as follows: The PeaceWomen Project promotes the role of women in preventing conflict, and the equal and full participation of women in all efforts to create and maintain international peace and security. PeaceWomen facilitates monitoring of the UN system, information sharing and the enabling of meaningful dialogue for positive impact on women’s lives in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
http://www.wilpfinternational.org
WILPF was established in the United States in January 1915 as the Woman's Peace Party. It is a non-profit non-governmental organization working "to bring together women of different political views and philosophical and religious backgrounds determined to study and make known the causes of war and work for a permanent peace" and to unite women worldwide who oppose oppression and exploitation. WILPF has national sections in 37 countries. WILPF is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and maintains a United Nations Office in New York City.

Women in International Security
http://csis.org/program/wiis
A project of the CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, WIIS seeks to advance women’s leadership in the international peace and security field by creating a global network of women in these fields.

Women PeaceMakers Program
http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ipj/programs/women_peace_makers/
Affiliated with the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice (IPJ), the Women PeaceMakers Program documents the stories and best practices of international women leaders who are involved in human rights and peacemaking efforts in their home countries. Women on the frontlines of efforts to end violence and secure a just peace seldom record their experiences, activities and insights as generally there is no time, or, perhaps, no formal education that would help women record their work. The Women PeaceMakers Program offers an opportunity for women leaders who want to document, share and build upon their unique peacemaking stories.

Women Peacemakers Program
http://www.ifor.org/WPP/index.html
Its mission is to support the empowerment of gender-sensitive women and men for the transformation of conflict through active nonviolence.
**Women Waging Peace Network**
http://www.huntalternatives.org/pages/82_women_waging_peace_network.cfm

Women Waging Peace, a program of Hunt Alternatives Fund, advocates for the full participation of women in formal and informal peace processes around the world. Over 250 members of the “Waging” network, all demonstrated leaders with varied backgrounds, perspectives, and skills, bring a vast array of expertise to the peacemaking process. They have met with over 1000 senior policy shapers to collaborate on fresh, workable solutions to long-standing conflicts.

**Working Group on Women, Peace and Security**
http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/

Formed in 2000, the NGOWG focuses on the implementation of Security Council resolutions addressing Women, Peace and Security. The NGOWG advocates for equal and full participation of women in peace and security efforts by serving as a bridge between local women’s advocates and the United Nations.

**Other Networks, Coalitions, and Associations:**

3P Human Security  
Catholic Relief Services - Peacebuilding Division  
Development Assistance Committee  
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict  
Norwegian Refugee Council  
PeaceWomen Across the Globe (PWAG)  
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (Canada)  
RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (Singapore)  
The Alliance for Peacebuilding  
The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research  
UN Peacebuilding Commission

**Africa:**

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution (South Africa)  
Amani Communities Africa (ACA)  
Center for Women in Governance (CEWIGO)  
Cadre Permanent de Concertation de la Femme Congolese (CAFCO)  
IMPACT for change and development  
Fountain-ISOKO for Good Governance and Integrated Development  
IFOR WPP Africa Program  
Kitgum Women Peace Initiative (KIWEPI)  
Liberia Media Action Committee (LIWOMAC)  
Lira Rural Women & Children Development Initiative Shelter (LIRWOCDI)  
Lira Women Peace Initiative (LIWEPI)  
Luwero Women Development Association (LUWODA)  
Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET)  
Mothers For Active Non-Violence (MOFAN-V)  
National Organization of Women (NOW)  
Réseau Femme et Développement (Women and Development Network)  
Rural Women Peace Link (RWPL)  
Rwanda Women’s Network
Tears of Women
Teso Women Peace Activists (TEWPA)
Voice of the Voiceless
West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP)
Women Allies Peacebuilders Network (WAP)
Women Care Initiative
Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET)
Women for Justice in Africa (WOJA)
Women’s Forum
Women’s League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) / DRC
Women Peacemakers Programme (WPP)
Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL)
Women’s Partnership for Justice and Peace (WPJP)
Women of Liberia Peace Network (WOLPN)

Asia and the Pacific:
FemLINKPACIFIC
Anti-Gender-Based Violence Coalition (Koalisi GBV) (Indonesia)
Asian Circle 1325
Association of War Affected Women
Center for Peace Education
Institute of Human Rights Communication (IHRICON)
Isis International
National Women Security Watch (NWSW)
Saathi
Samanata
Sancharika Samuha
N Peace Network
Anti-Gender-Based Violence Coalition (Koalisi GBV)

West Asia:
Afghan Women’s Network
Afghan Women’s Resource Center
Permanent Peace Movement

Latin America:
Corporacion de Investigacion y Accion Social e Economica (CIASE)
El Observatorio de Género Democracia y Derechos Humanos (OGDDHH)
La Liga de Mujeres Desplazadas
Red Nacional de Mujeres
Women and Peace Network (Guatemala)

RESEARCH CENTERS

Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights
http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Established in 2002, the Consortium is an organization devoted to building knowledge about gender, armed conflict, and security in order to integrate
the study of gender and of women into work on human rights, security, and armed conflict. By bridging the gap between research and practice, the Consortium seeks to create a world free of armed conflict and to bring sustainable peace. UMass Boston

**Center for Women Policy Studies**


The Center for Women Policy Studies was founded in 1972 as the first feminist policy analysis, research and advocacy institution in the US.

**Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations**

[http://www.clingendael.nl/](http://www.clingendael.nl/)

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” is platform which aim it is to enhance knowledge and insight in international relations. Clingendael acts as a think tank as well as a diplomatic academy.

**Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue**

[http://www.hdcentre.org](http://www.hdcentre.org)

HD Centre is an independent global mediation organization, with a presence in Europe, North America, Africa and Asia. Its aim is to help alleviate the suffering of individuals and populations caught up in both high-profile and forgotten conflicts, by acting as mediators and by providing other mediators with the support they need to work effectively.

**Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid**

[http://www.fride.org/page/5/about-fride](http://www.fride.org/page/5/about-fride)

FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, which provides innovative thinking and rigorous analysis of key debates in international relations. Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure that the EU plays a more effective role in supporting multilateralism, democratic values, security and sustainable development.

**Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF)**

[http://www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

DCAF is an international foundation established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss Confederation, as the ‘Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces’. DCAF contributes to enhancing security sector governance (SSG) through security sector reform (SSR). The Centre’s work to support effective, efficient security sectors which are accountable to the state and its citizens is underpinned by the acknowledgement that security, development and the rule of law are essential preconditions for sustainable peace.

**Heinrich Boell Foundation/ Heinrich Böll Stiftung**

[http://www.boell.org](http://www.boell.org)

The Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of the Green political movement that has developed worldwide as a response to the traditional politics of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Our main tenets are ecology and sustainability, democracy and human rights, self-determination and justice. We place particular emphasis on gender democracy, meaning social emancipation and equal rights for women and men. We are also committed to equal rights for cultural and ethnic minorities and to the societal and political participation of immigrants. Finally, we promote non-violence and proactive peace policies.
**ISIS-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange**  
[http://www.isis.or.ug](http://www.isis.or.ug)  
ISIS-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE) exists to promote justice and empowerment of women globally through documenting violations of women’s rights and facilitating the exchange of information and skills to strengthen women’s capacities, potential and visibility.

**Institute for Security Studies**  
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is a pan-African applied policy research institute headquartered in Pretoria, South Africa with offices in Cape Town, South Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Dakar, Senegal. The ISS is an established think tank working in the area of African human security. It seeks to mainstream human security perspectives into public policy processes and to influence decision makers within Africa and beyond. The objective of the Institute is to add critical balance and objectivity by providing timely, empirical research and contextual analysis of relevant human security issues to policy makers, area specialists, advocacy groups, and the media.

**Institute for Women, Peace and Security**  
[http://iwpsd.georgetown.edu](http://iwpsd.georgetown.edu)  
The Institute is affiliated with the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. It seeks to: ● Collect quantitative and qualitative data; ● Conduct evidence-based and evaluative research; ● Disseminate a constant stream of sharp analysis on the role and impact of women in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking, humanitarian emergencies, political transitions and post-conflict reconstruction; ● Convene thought leaders, political leaders, activists and practitioners, and to ● Train and mentor students and future leaders. In doing so, the Institute will serve as a repository of knowledge and inform the building of best practices for gender mainstreaming through a worldwide network of students, scholars, practitioners and policymakers.

**International Alert**  
[http://www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org)  
International Alert is an independent peacebuilding organization that works to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict.

**The International Crisis Group**  
[http://www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org)  
The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict.

**Peace Research Institute Oslo Gender Research**  
[http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Gender](http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Gender)  

**Quota Project**  
[http://www.quotaproyect.org](http://www.quotaproyect.org)  
Global Database of Quotas for Women  

**UN Peacemaker**
UN Peacemaker is a web-based operational support tool for international peacemaking professionals.

**UNU-WIDER : UNU-WIDER - United Nations University**
http://www.wider.unu.edu/
WIDER was established in 1985. The institute undertakes multidisciplinary research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the living conditions of the world’s poorest people; provides a forum for professional interaction and the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable, and environmentally sustainable growth; and promotes capacity strengthening and training for scholars and government officials in the fields of economic and social policy-making.

**UN Women**
http://www.unwomen.org
To support inter-governmental bodies, such as the Commission on the Status of Women, in their formulation of policies, global standards and norms.
To help Member States to implement these standards, standing ready to provide suitable technical and financial support to those countries that request it, and to forge effective partnerships with civil society. To hold the UN system accountable for its own commitments on gender equality, including regular monitoring of system-wide progress.

**United States Institute of Peace**
http://www.usip.org/
USIP is the independent, nonpartisan conflict management center created by Congress to prevent and mitigate international conflict without resorting to violence. USIP works to save lives, increase the government's ability to deal with conflicts before they escalate, reduce government costs, and enhance our national security.

**World Bank Gender and Development**

**OTHER CENTERS**
Africa Peace Research and Education Association (Uganda)
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes - ACCORD (South Africa)
Africa Peace Research and Education Association (Uganda)
Africa Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Network (APRN)
Angie Brooks International Centre for Women’s Empowerment, Leadership Development (Liberia)
Association Ivoirienne pour la Défense des Droits des Femmes (Côte d’Ivoire)
Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes (Mali)
Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management (Germany)
Carnegie Institute on Preventing Deadly Conflict (U.S.)
Carter Center (U.S.)
Center for Conflict Resolution (Uganda)
Center for Global Peace, American University (U.S.)
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland (U.S.)
Center on International Cooperation, New York University (U.S.)
Centre Africain de Recherche et d'Education pour la Paix et la Démocratie, Université Libre des Pays des Grands Lacs (DRC)
Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa)
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (South Africa)
Chr. Michelsen Institute (Norway)
Conciliation Resources (U.K.)
Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Sciences Research Council (U.S.)
Council on Foreign Relations
Human Rights Watch (Women’s Rights Division) (U.S.)
Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (U.K)
Institute for African Women in Politics (Sierra Leone)
Institute for Inclusive Security (U.S.)
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (U.S)
Institute of Security Studies (South Africa)
Institute for Women, Peace, Security and Development, Georgetown University (U.S.)
Institute of World Affairs (U.S.)
International Peace Institute (U.S.)
International Relations and Security Network
Law Refugee Center (Uganda)
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs - NUPI (Norway)
Oxford Research Group, Building Bridges For Global Security
Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program (University of Calgary, Canada)
Program on Negotiation, Global Negotiation Project, Harvard School (U.S.)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI (Sweden)
Swisspeace (Switzerland)
The Centre for War and Peace (U.S.)
Toda Institute for Peace and Policy Research (Japan)
Uganda Peace Research and Education Association (Uganda)
Women for International Peace and Arbitration
Women for Peace
Women in International Security
Women’s Learning Partnership
Women, Peace and Security Institute (UNDP, UN Women, UNFPA) (Ghana)
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars (U.S.)

JOURNALS
African Journal of Conflict Resolution
Africa Peace and Conflict Journal
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution
Capacity.org
Conflict Resolution Quarterly
Conflict, Security and Development
International Journal of Conflict and Violence
International Journal of Conflict Management
International Journal of Peace and Development Studies
International Journal for Peace Studies
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of Conflict Studies
Negotiation Journal, University of Harvard
Journal of Conflict and Security Law
Journal of Peace Education
Journal of Peace Research
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development
Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace
Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution
Peace and Conflict Studies Journal
Peace, Conflict and Development
Security Dialogue